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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     MARK I. SOKOLOW, et al.,
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                     Plaintiffs,
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                                               04 CV 397 (GBD)
                 v.
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      PALESTINE LIBERATION
      ORGANIZATION, et al.,
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                     Defendants.
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                                                New York, N.Y.
                                                February 17, 2015
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                                                10:00 a.m.
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      Before:
                           HON. GEORGE B. DANIELS,
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                                                District Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      ARNOLD & PORTER LLP
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           Attorneys for Plaintiffs
      BY: KENT A. YALOWITZ
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(Trial resumed; jury not present)

THE COURT: Good morning.

As you have already been notified, one of our jurors was stuck in Connecticut and called this morning at about 8, 8:30 and said, she I believe, could not get down here today. So I notified as quickly as possible all of the other jurors we will adjourn until tomorrow.

Let's use the time productively though. I have read all the letters. Let me first address the issue of what we have planned for tomorrow.

Mr. Rochon, let me start with you. Who do you intend to call at this point? How long is it going to take, and basically what is going to be the subject of that testimony?

MR. ROCHON: I expect to call two or three -- I am going to make the decision on the third actually during the examinations because there are two witnesses that relate to potentially the Wafa Idris bombing.

The first witness will being Amneh Reehan, the woman that wrote that letter. The second witness will be General Abu Yaman, who is one of the witnesses disclosed all along, and he was a GIS officer who was responsible for directing the arrest of Hashaika and eventually assisting in the transfer of Hashaika from where he was arrested to Ramallah. He will not be testifying that he saw the man escape or that the man escaped. He is of the view that he did escape, but he can't

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testify to that from actual knowledge. 1 2 THE COURT: So what is he going testify to? 3 MR. ROCHON: The first part of that, that the PA 4 directed his arrest, wanted his arrest, and there was never a direction that he be released. And that goes as to the PA's 5 6 position as to this person Hashaika. 7 THE COURT: Remind me -- go ahead. MR. ROCHON: The plaintiffs claim that Abdel Karim 8 9 Aweis got him from the jail, along with Nasser Shawish, the two 10 of them, and they have been arrested together in a town called 11 Tulkarm. And from my client's standpoint, we wanted to 12 establish that he was in fact arrested, that the PA wanted him 13 in custody. He has an official position. That is this quy's 14 job. 15 THE COURT: So he arrested this individual? MR. ROCHON: He directed the arrest of this 16 17 individual. He was a more senior person. He also helped to 18 coordinate the transfer, and the transfer of this individual 19 person from Tulkarm to Ramallah was done in coordination with 20 the United States. 21 THE COURT: Was he on the Zinni list? 22 MR. ROCHON: No, not that I know of. 23 Put it this way, no one says he was.

THE COURT: He wasn't on the list that we saw.

So I am just trying to make sure I understand the

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Ramallah.

THE COURT:

When?

limits and the scope of his testimony. 1 So he is going to say that he directed that he be 2 3 arrested. And he is going to say he did that why? 4 MR. ROCHON: Because they received information that he 5 was going to be engaged in an attack. That information, I 6 believe, was provided by the Israelis to the Palestinians. 7 THE COURT: He was arrested when? 8 MR. ROCHON: February 10 or 11. 9 THE COURT: Of? 10 MR. ROCHON: 2002. 11 THE COURT: So he was arrested. Remind me, which incident? 12 13 MR. ROCHON: The incident in which he did commit a 14 suicide attack was March 21. 15 THE COURT: So he is going to say that the Israelis told him to arrest him. He gave the order to arrest that 16 17 individual. That individual was arrested in about February of 2002. 18 MR. ROCHON: Yes. 19 20 THE COURT: What else does he have to say? MR. ROCHON: Then the decision was made that he should 21 22 be held in Ramallah instead of in Tulkarm because it was more 23 They coordinated the transfer of him from Tulkarm to

1 MR. ROCHON: That would have been February --Still in February. 2 THE COURT: 3 MR. ROCHON: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Days after his initial arrest. 5 MR. ROCHON: Not long after his initial arrest. 6 Do you know the date of his arrest? THE COURT: 7 MR. ROCHON: The 10th is the arrest. THE COURT: He was transferred on what date? 8 9 MR. ROCHON: Shortly thereafter. 10 THE COURT: Within that week? Three or four days or three or four weeks? 11 12 MR. ROCHON: Closer to three or four days. 13 witness doesn't have a specific date to give us, but not three 14 or four weeks. 15 THE COURT: So the person arrested was suspected of being a terrorist bomber, intending to carry out a terrorist 16 17 attack. He was arrested in February and then he was transferred to Ramallah. 18 19 What else does he have to say? 20 MR. ROCHON: He assisted and coordinated, because they 21 needed Americans to assist, so he was transferred in an armed 22 convoy. It was actually a convoy with the United States in the 23 front and rear car, Palestinians in the middle. The reason is 24 because they were going through areas in which no Palestinian 25 security officials could have a weapon and they wanted the

1 transfer --2 He was transferred to the Mukataa? THE COURT: 3 MR. ROCHON: Yes, and placed into a cell there in the military intelligence section. 4 THE COURT: What else does he have to say after that? 5 6 MR. ROCHON: That's the gist of his testimony as to 7 Hashaika. 8 THE COURT: Does he have any knowledge about how 9 Hashaika got out of prison weeks before the terrorist attack? 10 MR. ROCHON: He is not able to say that he got out 11 weeks before. In fact, your Honor, I don't believe that's the 12 He can't specify when he got out. 13 He definitely got before March 21. THE COURT: 14 MR. ROCHON: Exactly. 15 THE COURT: He got out weeks before. 16 MR. ROCHON: I don't know if it was weeks or days. 17 He is not going to offer testimony as to when he got 18 out. 19 THE COURT: He has no testimony to offer as to when or 20 how he got out? 21 MR. ROCHON: He has nothing that I would consider to 22 be admissible testimony that I could present as to how he got 23 He has a view, but the rules evidence would not allow it. 24 THE COURT: His view is as good as yours. 25 MR. ROCHON: Probably a little better than mine, but

1 not good enough. 2 Not admissible evidence. He has no THE COURT: 3 firsthand knowledge of how this guy walked out of prison or 4 escaped. Ran, walked, crawled, however he got out of prison. 5 MR. ROCHON: I can't offer him for that. 6 That's about 13 minutes of testimony. 7 THE COURT: Do you have any problems with any of that, Mr. Yalowitz? 8 9 MR. YALOWITZ: Yes, I do. 10 THE COURT: What is your problem? MR. YALOWITZ: Number one, I don't know what it means 11 12 to say he directed or coordinated. If the guy --13 THE COURT: He gave the order. 14 MR. YALOWITZ: That's what you said. I didn't hear 15 Rochon say that. THE COURT: If he is not going to say that, then he is 16 17 not going to testify. MR. ROCHON: I believe I said he directed the arrest. 18 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't know what that means. 19 20 THE COURT: I assume he gave the order. 21 MR. ROCHON: Yes. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: Is that what that means? 23 THE COURT: He just said yes. 24 MR. YALOWITZ: He kind of mumbled it. I didn't hear 25 it.

THE COURT: Yes is the answer. 1 2 MR. YALOWITZ: All right. That's the first thing. 3 The second thing is, this business about they couldn't 4 go through certain areas because Palestinians weren't allowed 5 to have guns. That's clearly outside the bounds. It's not 6 relevant. 7 THE COURT: I agree with you. I am going to keep that 8 out. 9 MR. YALOWITZ: This is the problem I have with these 10 defendants and their witnesses. 11 THE COURT: Tell me substantively what your problem 12 is. 13 MR. YALOWITZ: I said it and you have said you're 14 going to keep it out. I believe you. I don't believe them. 15 THE COURT: Anything else? 16 MR. YALOWITZ: Yes. 17 THE COURT: If he wants to say that they arrested him 18 with the assistance of the U.S. government and they had a 19 convoy that went and took him to Ramallah, I have no problem 20 with that. 21 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't have a problem with that. 22 I am very, very concerned that we are going to have a 23 witness who tries to slip in hearsay. 24 THE COURT: He will not. I am directing he not. 25 not going to happen.

MR. YALOWITZ: That is one issue I am worried about. The other is I heard Rochon say there was never an order to release Hashaika. How can that guy possibly know that?

THE COURT: He can say he never gave an order to release Hashaika. I don't know if that's what he is going to testify to. You're right, he can't testify that an order was never given. If they want to elicit that, he can say he never gave an order to release.

Quite frankly, as I think it out, if he has no idea how he got out, I don't know why it's relevant that he didn't give an order to release him.

MR. YALOWITZ: I agree with that.

THE COURT: Mr. Rochon, did you intend to offer that testimony?

MR. ROCHON: Yes. I feel like plaintiffs are doing a heck of job of stripping away everything that we might put in.

Now, this witness directed his arrest. He did not give an order he be released. He is a senior person in Ramallah. He is unaware of any order to direct his release.

THE COURT: The fact that he unaware of it is irrelevant. You're not aware of it. I'm not aware of it. We

don't know how he got out. It doesn't make it more or less likely that he got out based on someone else's assistance or direction.

MR. ROCHON: As a senior person in that particular region, his lack of awareness of that is relevant.

It's one thing to say, does it prove conclusively no order was given? No. But is it relevant that he is unaware of any such order? Of course it is relevant.

THE COURT: It's only relevant that he never gave such an order. If he never gave such an order, maybe it's relevant. I don't know why it's relevant at all since you're not calling him for any circumstantial or direct evidence as to how he was released.

If you're trying to imply that he must have escaped because this person didn't give the order to release him, I don't think that's admissible.

MR. ROCHON: As long as the plaintiffs aren't going to argue it was within Abdullah Karim Aweis's scope of authority --

MR. YALOWITZ: Of course it was.

MR. ROCHON: Let me finish, Mr. Yalowitz.

As long as they are not going to argue that, then I don't need to put in what my witness understood to be the authority.

THE COURT: I didn't understand that.

MR. ROCHON: They are going to claim Abdel Karim Aweis got him out.

THE COURT: Your witness doesn't know whether or not Aweis got him out, right?

MR. ROCHON: Right.

THE COURT: That's the end of that discussion. He doesn't know whether that's true or not.

MR. ROCHON: Judge, here is the argument.

You and Mr. Yalowitz are focusing on whether this guy is going to say he escaped. This testimony is relevant as to whether or not, if Mr. Aweis did that, whether it was within his scope of authority as an employee of the PA. And in that vein, it's important that I should be able to establish what this individual's mental state was as to whether any such release was authorized.

THE COURT: How would be know that?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  ROCHON: Because he is one step down in the GIS, and GIS --

THE COURT: He doesn't know whether his boss gave the order. He doesn't know whether Arafat gave the order. He doesn't know whether someone below him, above someone else gave the order. All he can say is he didn't give the order.

MR. ROCHON: It is relevant as to whether or not an order was given, whether or not this man ever was aware of such an order.

THE COURT: Why? Who cares if he is aware of the order. He either knows or he didn't know.

MR. ROCHON: Because in the course of his duties, if there had been such an order, it's the kind of thing he should have been told about.

THE COURT: Unless they didn't want him to know.

MR. ROCHON: The question of whether or not it is conclusive proof is different than whether it's relevant to show an issue in dispute, which is whether or not Abdel Karim Aweis acted within his authority if in fact he got him out as they claim.

THE COURT: The fact is, when he comes here to tell us what he is unaware of is not a proper subject of his testimony. He can tell us what he is aware of. He is not the only person. No one is arguing that it was his act that constituted the scope of employment.

Unless he or someone else has some direct evidence to give as to how this person got out of prison, the fact that he doesn't have a clue about how he got out of prison, first of all, that's a little inconsistent that he would have known if somebody had given the order. If he had gotten out anyway, he should have known how he got out. He should have some information.

MR. ROCHON: He has a clue.

THE COURT: What basis does he have? Did someone

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1 inform him how this guy got out? MR. ROCHON: No. You said he doesn't have a clue. 2 3 actually has a clue. 4 THE COURT: A clue means he knows. He doesn't know, 5 right? MR. ROCHON: He has no admissible evidence. 6 7 THE COURT: He doesn't know. 8 MR. ROCHON: As you and I would use the word know, he 9 does not know. 10 THE COURT: As he would use the word know, he would 11 say, I don't know. 12 MR. ROCHON: Based on custom and practice, he would 13 have a view. I am not going to seek to elicit it. 14 THE COURT: If he is asked, do you know how this 15 person got out of prison, he would answer, no, I do not. 16 MR. ROCHON: If you phrased the question to say, do 17 you know of your own person knowledge --18 THE COURT: I didn't say that. If I ask him, do you 19 know how this person got out of prison, he would say I do not. 20 MR. ROCHON: That would be the best answer you could 21 give. Most human beings in that position, given what he knows, 22 he actually believes he escaped. 23 THE COURT: How does he believe he got out? What does 24 he believe happened that constituted his release from prison?

MR. ROCHON: They received warnings from -- I am not

seeking to elicit this. But every time you ask me what he in fact believes, Mr. Yalowitz thinks I am trying to get that into evidence.

THE COURT: It's not coming into evidence. You're saying it's relevant somehow to his state of mind and you keep saying he has a clue and I want to know what that clue is.

What does he think happened?

MR. ROCHON: He believes that when the Israelis called to warn that there was going to a bombing of the Mukataa, the men who were guarding the military intelligence prison, like others in Mukataa, vacated it.

THE COURT: Did they unlock all the doors so the prisoners can get out?

MR. ROCHON: Therefore, the security was such that they could get out.

THE COURT: What does that mean? Just because the guards left the prison -- I could be a guard at Rikers Island. If I decide that somebody says there is a bomb threat and I run out and I decide I'm not going to stick around, all the prisoners don't get to walk out. Someone has to release them too.

MR. ROCHON: In other prisons when they were blown up, prisoners and officers died and --

THE COURT: I am asking you, how does he think -- not how the guards got out -- how does he think the prisoners got

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 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  ROCHON: He thinks at that point the security was such that prisoners could get out.

THE COURT: How?

MR. ROCHON: Your view of the prison and mine --

THE COURT: I am just asking you.

I am just asking you, tell me physically how he believed the prisoners got out of prison. He thinks everybody got out?

MR. ROCHON: Yeah, I think everybody did get out.

THE COURT: How does he think that was effectuated?

MR. ROCHON: Either when the bombing happened that destroyed the prison or before.

THE COURT: Or before?

MR. ROCHON: Yes.

THE COURT: How would it have happened before?

MR. ROCHON: A guard may have unlocked doors so prisoners wouldn't have got killed. That wouldn't be a release.

THE COURT: That would be a release. I am just saying, I don't understand your argument. That is a release. If you want to argue they released him for another reason, that's different. That is a release. If they open the door and say, you know it's dangerous here, we don't think you should stick around, go home, that's a release. Right?

MR. ROCHON: I am not arguing to get that into evidence. The only reason we are talking about this is I mentioned that he does in fact have what he considers to be a clue as to how they got out. I am not going to be putting that into evidence.

What I am arguing for is that the witness who directed the arrest should be allowed to say that he is unaware of any order that they be released.

THE COURT: What you just gave me of how he thought they got out is inconsistent with that position, that he was unaware of any order to release them. You just said the way he thinks they got out is because the place was going to be bombed. The people gave an order that all the guards should leave and somehow before the prison was bombed somebody let them out.

MR. ROCHON: I am only trying to put in some of the evidence. I can tell you what the guy thinks happened.

The Israelis first hit on Mukataa was at a specific place, a fuel plant. When they hit that fuel plant there was some damage to the prison as well. He believes that is when people got out.

THE COURT: He believes they blew the wall open and they just walked out.

MR. ROCHON: I am not trying to get this into evidence.

THE COURT: You are trying to get it in. If you want to abandon your proffer of his opinion or his knowledge about whether somebody else gave the order, then we don't have to have that discussion. I am giving you an opportunity to convince me that he has some basis on which to say that it's more likely than not that nobody gave an order to release this guy days or weeks before he committed a suicide bomb.

MR. ROCHON: The only way a member of a law enforcement organization can say he is unaware of an order is to bring in every person --

THE COURT: I never said that. You don't have to argue that. I am trying to figure out what the basis is for his knowledge and how is it relevant and how does it make it more likely than not that he didn't give the order and he wasn't there when somebody else gave the order.

MR. ROCHON: He didn't give such an order. He is the number two man in this organization. He believes that his boss did not give an order.

THE COURT: Why does he believe that?

MR. ROCHON: Because his boss is the one who told him to make sure these guys get arrested.

THE COURT: So?

MR. ROCHON: That is evidence that his boss wished for them to be arrested. That's inconsistent with that he wished for them to be released.

THE COURT: No. Clearly people have been arrested and released according to the plaintiffs. They say that's the MO.

MR. ROCHON: They say that, but I don't have to accept it.

THE COURT: No, you don't. You have to give me some facts that dispute that.

What is the fact that he is going to testify to that disputes that? He has no more basis than you to even know whether or not somebody else gave the order.

MR. ROCHON: I would say to the court that your questions to me I think are better for Mr. Yalowitz's cross than as a basis to exclude from the evidence altogether this witness's statement that he is unaware of any order directing this person be released, given that he knows he didn't, and he was the number two guy there, and he was in daily communication with the number one guy, and the number one guy, who is Tawfiq Tirawi. Plaintiffs have said things about him, but we don't have to accept them.

Tawfiq Tirawi is the one who told him to make sure these people were arrested, that directed him to contact Tulkarm and ensure their arrest. Therefore, it would be inconsistent with wanting the person out, to have arrested them, and then move them to a more --

THE COURT: Mr. Rochon, the problem I have -- and I think this is your burden, not theirs -- the problem that I

have with all of your arguments that you have made with regard to whether he was released, or whether or not any of these people were released, or whether they escaped, is you are in the best position to call someone and tell us how these people got out of prison. You have decided not to do so, not to take on that burden. So I am asking you all of these questions, and these aren't magical questions. They are not trick questions.

I am asking you, look, your people, they controlled the prison. All you have to do is give me a proffer about what you say is the true fact about how they got out of prison. You have declined to do so. But you want to imply that there is some basis to conclude that they got out innocently. I can't let you just hide behind the fact that you don't want to tell us how they got out of prison because you know. Your people know. They know one way or the other. Just tell me how they got out. You keep dancing around this issue.

MR. ROCHON: I can't find the guards who were in the prison.

THE COURT: You can tell me what the official position is, chapter and verse, about how these people got out of jail. You do not have that. Your people have not told you that, or if they have told you that, it is something you have decided to decline to tell me.

I don't know how these people got out of prison. Your people know how these people got out of prison. This is the

guy you say is number two in the GIS and he doesn't know how they got out of prison?

MR. ROCHON: Judge, because he wasn't at the prison when they got out. The only evidence you are letting me put in is an --

THE COURT: I am letting you put in any person that was at the prison when they were released, any person that was there the day before, any person that can give me some facts back up your theory of these people must have escaped. That's the only thing that you have proffered.

You have a theory that they must have escaped. You have no witness who is willing to come into this courthouse who is an employee of the defendant who will say they escaped on Tuesday because the building was bombed. I was there on Monday. They were locked up. I showed up on Wednesday and the building fell down and the walls collapsed and everybody was missing. You have proffered no substantive evidence about how they got out, which is a basis for me to conclude that, one, either you don't want me to tell, which I don't conclude, or your people are incapable of telling me. So if they are incapable of telling me, I am not going to let them come in here and imply that they know something that they don't.

You have brought nobody in this case at all during this trial to say how any individual who was locked up by the PA or the PLO got out of jail. Not a single fact. Not a

single witness who could testify as to either, direct or hearsay evidence, as to how it is they got out.

What am I supposed to do with that? I am supposed to let you have people just keep saying we didn't release them, we don't think anybody else released them, we think they must have escaped?

MR. ROCHON: If you let me put in hearsay evidence, I would have had it.

THE COURT: You're not entitled to hearsay evidence. You have direct evidence. You could have asked that. As a matter of fact, I asked you what the hearsay evidence is and you have not to this day told me how any particular person got out of prison even based on hearsay.

MR. ROCHON: You have asked me --

THE COURT: I asked you how did they get out.

MR. ROCHON: I have a view of how they got out.

THE COURT: I don't want your view. I want a fact. I want somebody to say, you know what, even if it's hearsay, this person can say, I am most concerned about this. I showed up the next day and I said, where are all the prisoners? That's what I would expect. And then somebody would have said to him, I'm sorry, general or colonel or whatever his title is, I'm sorry, those people escaped yesterday.

You're saying he is so concerned about arresting him and transporting him to a more secure facility. The day after

they are all missing, he doesn't have a clue how they got out. Doesn't have a report from anybody, written or oral, as to the details of how these people left the prison. There is no person that you have alluded to that had direct or circumstantial evidence and can tell us how these people left the prison.

So he can come and he can testify about how he made the arrest and how he delivered these people to the prison and the last thing he saw was that they were locked up in the prison. If he wants to testify, and I am not even sure why he should go there, but if he wants to testify that he didn't personally give an order to release them, he can testify to that. He cannot testify about his knowledge or lack of knowledge about whether or not anyone else gave an order to release him.

That's my ruling.

MR. ROCHON: I understand the court's ruling. The court's questions and comments as to whether there is a factual basis for our belief that they escaped --

THE COURT: I asked you what is the factual basis.

MR. ROCHON: We have talked to many people who have given us reports that they escaped.

THE COURT: How did they escape? That's a very simple question.

MR. ROCHON: What we have been told by others is the

jail was destroyed and that's how these guys got out. I don't 1 have the witness to present on that. 2 3 THE COURT: They didn't get out all on the same day. 4 MR. ROCHON: These two did. 5 THE COURT: You have made the same argument. 6 MR. ROCHON: Barghouti wasn't in the same prison. 7 THE COURT: That's the point. His prison wasn't 8 destroyed. So that's not the argument for how he got out. 9 You have got nobody who said, I heard that this is 10 exactly -- what is the fact about what you heard, hearsay or 11 otherwise, about how Barghouti got out? 12 MR. ROCHON: We have heard the same thing, that there 13 was a destruction of the jail. 14 THE COURT: That means what? That means the jail was bombed and the walls were destroyed and so they just walked out 15 16 of the prison. That is what your belief is. 17 MR. ROCHON: That's our understanding. I don't have 18 an eyewitness on it, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: You don't have any report, even a hearsay 20 report, to anybody? 21 Mr. Rochon. 22 MR. ROCHON: On Hashaika we do have a report. It's in 23 evidence. 24 THE COURT: Not as to the details of how he got out of 25 the prison.

1 MR. ROCHON: As to the fact of the escape. 2 Think about it. You're telling me how THE COURT: 3 important it is to make sure these people were in a secure 4 facility. These people are just missing the next day. You're 5 saying there is no investigation, there is no written report, 6 there is no I spoke to this quard and this quard said. 7 is absolutely nothing that indicates how it is that they escaped except this one reference. I can't even say that. 8 9 There is absolutely no written or oral statement by anyone or 10 received by anyone as to how they got out other than they must 11 have escaped. 12 MR. ROCHON: As to Barghouti, I proffered to you that 13 there was an investigation. 14 THE COURT: How was it determined that Barghouti got 15 out? 16 MR. ROCHON: That he had escaped. 17 THE COURT: How? 18 MR. ROCHON: I wasn't allowed to put it in. 19 THE COURT: Tell me. I am asking you to tell me that. 20 MR. ROCHON: Destruction of the facility. 21 THE COURT: How does that facilitate his release? 22 MR. ROCHON: It wasn't secure anymore. 23 THE COURT: What does that mean? The lock was broken? 24 The walls fell down? Did all the other prisoners escape at the 25 same time? What does that mean?

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MR. ROCHON: Judge, what it means is this. During that period of time, as you have heard, jails were being bombed, prisons were being bombed. THE COURT: You don't have to go back through that. That doesn't tell me the details of how this individual left the prison or how any individual left the prison. You want to give me a general, oh, well, anybody that you figured out that we arrested and was in prison is no longer in prison, it's because they escaped when the building was blown up. all you have given me. MR. ROCHON: As to these two individuals, which are the only ones in question in this case --THE COURT: Are these the only two individuals that escaped when the building was bombed? MR. ROCHON: We haven't conducted a factual investigation as to others. THE COURT: You didn't ask anybody that? MR. ROCHON: It hasn't been our focus. It is 13 years ago. THE COURT: So? MR. ROCHON: It will a little hard to find --THE COURT: So are all of these facts you're trying to give the jury 13 years ago. MR. ROCHON: I am just saying when the court suggests

that the absence of a witness to corroborate what others

understand to be the case --

THE COURT: It's not an absence of corroboration; it is an absence of any explanation about how they escaped during bombings of the prisons.

MR. ROCHON: Somehow I have ended up telling you that I am not trying to put on a witness to say that he escaped.

THE COURT: You said you want him to say he is not aware of anyone giving an order to release him so that the jury can imply and infer that he must have escaped. It has no other relevance, does it?

MR. ROCHON: It goes as to whether or not if Abdel Karim Aweis, who was subordinate to this individual, got him out, it was not with authority. They want to argue it was within the scope of his authority when he got him out. They want to argue that. It is relevant to his scope of authority, the fact that this individual is unaware of any such order. That doesn't infer escape or not escape. But it does go to scope of authority. To prohibit us from putting that on allows the plaintiff to argue that was within the scope of authority and limits us --

THE COURT: This guy cannot say that an order was not given by this person and he cannot say that that order wasn't within the scope of his authority.

MR. ROCHON: I am not going to say --

THE COURT: He can't say that.

MR. ROCHON: But he can say, but you won't let me. 1 2 THE COURT: Every witness you want to call can say, I 3 am unaware of any order releasing this guy from prison. You 4 had the head of GIS here. MR. ROCHON: Yes. He wasn't head of GIS at the time. 5 THE COURT: He wasn't head of GIS either. 6 7 MR. ROCHON: He was the person who coordinated the arrest of the individual, the placement of where he was 8 9 located. 10 THE COURT: Did he head up any investigation as to how 11 this person got out of prison? 12 MR. ROCHON: No, sir. 13 THE COURT: OK. That issue is set aside. He can't 14 testify that he is unaware that somebody else gave the order. 15 You have another issue on that witness? MR. YALOWITZ: Yes, I do. I have a big issue about 16 17 closing with all of this. Mr. Rochon just stood here and he 18 looked you in the eye and lied to you. 19 MR. ROCHON: You know, Judge --20 THE COURT: That blows past me, Mr. Rochon. You know 21 that. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: He put on a witness Faraj who said 23 there was only one jail that was destroyed. That was the sworn 24 testimony of his witness, Faraj. He put on a witness Ashrawi 25

who said that the Mukataa prison was bombed at the end of March

or later 2002. So that's not when Hashaika got out of jail.

Hashaika was already dead by then. Then he put on a witness

Shehadeh, who said the preventive security, which is where

Abdullah Barghouti was held, that building was bombed in April

of 2002, and Abdullah Barghouti was released in August of 2001.

So if he is willing to look you in the eye -- I will

be more polite -- and bullshit you, then what is he going to do

with the jury talking about all of the prisons were destroyed?

THE COURT: Mr. Yalowitz, I am going to put a stop to this. Don't use that kind of language to describe anything

that's going on in this case. Have a seat.

Mr. Rochon, your third witness, let's assume your third witness is going to testify, what is this third witness going to testify to?

MR. ROCHON: He is the one who filled out the Wafa Idris martyr file. He is actually the person who filled out the file. He doesn't know if somebody filled it out.

THE COURT: He is going to testify to what?

MR. ROCHON: As to the basis for the language in the file. In the file there is language that the plaintiffs have alluded to that characterizes the operation and he would explain why he wrote that.

THE COURT: What is he going to explain?

MR. ROCHON: That's how it was referred to in the public media and that was his source of the information.

1 THE COURT: What facts are you focused on? MR. ROCHON: Wafa Idris. 2 3 THE COURT: What was the issue? 4 MR. ROCHON: In the recommendation portion of the 5 file, plaintiffs have focused on a statement that -- I will get 6 the exact language -- that she died in a heroic martyrdom 7 That's in his handwriting. I would like to ask him operation. where did you get that information. 8 9 THE COURT: What is he going to say? That wasn't his 10 conclusion? 11 MR. ROCHON: That was how it was referred to in the 12 media. 13 THE COURT: He wrote that based on the reference in 14 the media. 15 MR. ROCHON: He would explain, when you have a situation like that, they have no evidence of what happened 16 17 other than the family coming in, because they don't have a 18 body, they don't have a death certificate. All they have is really what the family says or public information and that's 19 20 why he wrote that letter. 21 THE COURT: At most, we will have two to three 22 witnesses by the defense tomorrow. 23 MR. ROCHON: Yes. Total testimony I think an hour, 15 24 minutes, unless the cross is very long, which hopefully, given 25 how tailored I have tried to make my direct, should not be an

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opportunity to get into the entire case and say, what do you 1 2 think about this, that and the other thing? Because I think 3 what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. 4 THE COURT: It usually is in this courtroom. 5 one of you has been happy with any of my rulings. 6 Mr. Yalowitz, after the defense rests, first of all, 7 you want to offer Exhibit 1281? Is that the primary purpose of this rebuttal? 8 9 MR. YALOWITZ: No, that's not the primary rebuttal. 10 Remind me, 1281 is? 11 THE COURT: 1987 designation. 12 MR. YALOWITZ: That's definitely not the primary 13 purpose. 14 THE COURT: Are you intending to attempt to offer that 15 in evidence? MR. YALOWITZ: We are considering offering that in 16 17 evidence. 18 THE COURT: You can forget that. 19 MR. YALOWITZ: Fine. 20 THE COURT: There is already testimony in this case 21 that during the relevant time period the PLO was not considered 22 to be a terrorist organization designated by the United States 23 or the Secretary of State. That's the relevant time period.

MR. YALOWITZ: Let's move on.

1987 is a whole different ball game.

1 THE COURT: I am not so sure what you want to call the rebuttal witness to say. What is he rebutting? 2 3 MR. YALOWITZ: For example, we heard testimony that 4 Tirawi is a free man today, and there is an implication that 5 Shrenzel was incomplete in his description of what was going on 6 with Tirawi during cross. I want to clean that up. 7 THE COURT: What do you say it was implied that Shrenzel did or didn't? 8 9 MR. YALOWITZ: Shrenzel said Tirawi was not indicted 10 or tried or convicted because the Israeli authorities did not 11 catch him. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. YALOWITZ: The implication from the Faraj 14 testimony was he was easy to catch. There was no problem. And 15 therefore Shrenzel must have been lying. That's the 16 implication. 17 THE COURT: He doesn't have to be lying. He just doesn't have to be correct. 18 MR. YALOWITZ: Or he wasn't correct. 19 20 So Shrenzel can explain that answer. He is going to 21 say that Tirawi was in the Mukataa under the protection of 22 Arafat. And then there was a change in policy toward Tirawi. 23 THE COURT: By whom? 24 MR. YALOWITZ: By the Israeli authorities. 25 THE COURT: If anything, that's what contradicts him,

not the other testimony. He didn't say that he wasn't arrested because there was a change in policy by the Israelis. He said he wasn't arrested because they couldn't find him.

MR. YALOWITZ: He said they didn't catch him.

THE COURT: Let me take your words. They didn't arrest him because -- they didn't catch him. I think you would agree that the reasonable import of his testimony was that he was not arrested because they couldn't find him and they couldn't arrest him. That's what he said.

MR. YALOWITZ: They knew exactly where he was.

THE COURT: But he had an opportunity to say that ultimately the real reason he wasn't arrested was because the Israelis made a decision not to arrest him.

MR. YALOWITZ: Right.

THE COURT: But he never said that.

MR. YALOWITZ: He can say that now.

THE COURT: Shouldn't he have said that while he was a witness on direct, redirect or cross? How does that rebut something that happened on the defense case?

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ YALOWITZ}$\colon$\;\;$  Because the defense says he is a free man today.

THE COURT: Isn't that true?

MR. YALOWITZ: I think it is true.

THE COURT: And he is a free man because the Israelis don't want him.

MR. YALOWITZ: I think that's true. 1 THE COURT: But he is not a free man because they 2 3 can't find him or they can't arrest him. 4 MR. YALOWITZ: Right. 5 I think he should be allowed to give a moment of 6 testimony --7 THE COURT: What is he going to say about why he 8 didn't testify to that as the reason this person was not 9 arrested? 10 MR. YALOWITZ: Because I didn't ask him. 11 THE COURT: He was asked. He was asked, why didn't 12 they arrest him and he said that they couldn't find him. 13 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't think he said that. 14 THE COURT: That's what he meant. 15 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't think that's what he meant. THE COURT: What did he mean? 16 17 MR. YALOWITZ: I believe what he meant was they chose 18 not to capture him. 19 THE COURT: That's not what he said. Do you have his 20 transcript page you can reference me to? 21 MR. YALOWITZ: We can look it up. We looked at it 22 over the weekend. 23 THE COURT: That's clearly not my recollection. 24 MR. YALOWITZ: He said capture. 25 THE COURT: He clearly gave the jury the impression

that they were unable, not unwilling, but unable to arrest him. 1 2 MR. YALOWITZ: Let's look at it. 3 THE COURT: Does anybody have that page? 4 MR. HILL: 1588. 5 MR. ROCHON: That is one of the references. 6 1514, he said: Because he was not in the hands of the Israeli 7 authorities, that's the only reason. Were he captured by the Israelis, as we really like to do, he would have been indicted. 8 9 Later he said that he was one of the most wanted 10 terror operatives by Israel. He was not captured by Israel and 11 was not put to justice. THE COURT: The first part is what I remember. 12 13 was the first part again? 14 MR. ROCHON: 1514, your Honor. THE COURT: Let me just take a look. I don't have a 15 16 strong opinion. 17 MR. YALOWITZ: What happened was Mr. Rochon takes what 18 he says and kind of shifts it a little bit and leaves you, and 19 perhaps the jury, with a misimpression. 20 THE COURT: If it was a misimpression, it was given by 21 Shrenzel, inadvertently or deliberately, because he did not say 22 that they decided they no longer wanted him for any crime. 23 That would have been the natural answer to that question, 24 wouldn't it? 25 MR. YALOWITZ: There are two fact points that I think

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should be cleared up based on the testimony of Faraj and the questions of Faraj about could have been captured.

Point number one, the Israeli authorities did not capture Tirawi because they didn't want to break into the

Number two --

THE COURT: Where does he get that from?

Mukataa or Arafat was protecting Tirawi, number one.

MR. YALOWITZ: That I can't tell you what his basis for it is off the top of my head.

THE COURT: That's a fact. That's not an opinion.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's a fact.

THE COURT: I assume he wasn't there personally. Where does he get that fact from?

MR. YALOWITZ: I have to ask him.

THE COURT: You better ask him because he is not going to testify because that's what he wants to say.

What is the second?

MR. YALOWITZ: Fact number two is that the Israeli government had a change in policy and decided no longer to pursue Tirawi.

THE COURT: OK. He is going to say the reason why he is not today in prison, the reason why he was never indicted ultimately is because they decided not to indict.

MR. YALOWITZ: Correct.

THE COURT: But that's not the answer he gave.

MR. YALOWITZ: I think it's consistent with the answer he gave, which is they didn't catch him.

THE COURT: No. Mr. Yalowitz, you're giving me lawyer speak now. This is common sense.

The guy was asked, you asked the guy correctly, what happened to this guy? And somebody asked him more than once, why didn't they ever arrest this guy? And he said because they couldn't capture him. That's all he said.

MR. YALOWITZ: He didn't say they couldn't capture him.

He said they didn't capture him. Unfortunately, that's an ambiguous answer.

THE COURT: The direct, truthful answer would have been that because they ultimately decided they didn't want him. He never volunteered that. He never cleared that up.

Look, I don't need to debate this point with you.

Quite frankly, if you want to call him for that purpose and subject him to further cross-examination on that issue, I guess they would welcome that.

Is there anything else other than trying to clear up the misconception that you say that they have created on their case that somehow he was not arrested because the Israelis didn't want him?

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ YALOWITZ}\colon$$  Yes. There are a couple of other things.

1 THE COURT: What else? MR. YALOWITZ: The relationship between the defendants 2 3 and Hamas, which Faraj testified about that it was a terrible, 4 hateful relationship. 5 THE COURT: What is he going to say that he didn't 6 already say? 7 MR. YALOWITZ: He is going to say that this guy Yassin, the guy with the picture being kissed, wasn't a 8 9 spiritual leader, wasn't about to die, which is the impression 10 that the defendants left, that he was actually an important 11 Hamas guy. THE COURT: We know he was an important Hamas quy. 12 13 How does he know he wasn't about to die? MR. YALOWITZ: Because he didn't die in 2004. 14 15 THE COURT: When was this kiss supposedly? MR. YALOWITZ: Before he died. 16 17 THE COURT: How much longer before? 18 MR. YALOWITZ: I can't say. 19 THE COURT: I don't want to waste a lot of the jurors' 20 He is going to rebut their statement that he was going time. 21 to die. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: He is going to rebut the impression left with the jury that there was a hostile relationship 23 24 between Hamas and the PA. 25 THE COURT: He is going to rebut that by saying what?

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               MR. YALOWITZ: Number one, he is going to comment on
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      it briefly.
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               THE COURT: What is he going to say?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: He is going to say that they had a
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      cooperative relationship during the Intifada.
               THE COURT: Which means what?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: Which means they did operations
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      together.
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               THE COURT: What does that mean?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: They planned suicide operations and
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      conducted suicide operations together.
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               THE COURT: What is he basing that on, that they
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      planned suicide operations together?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: He has done the research of looking up
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     many suicide operations.
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               THE COURT: Is that in his expert report?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: I don't believe it is, no.
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               THE COURT: On what basis does he have the right to
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      give that expert opinion at this point in this trial?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: I think it's fair ground for rebuttal.
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               THE COURT: Why?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: Because the defendants, unexpectedly in
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     my view, said that they have a hostile relationship.
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               THE COURT: What did you expect them to say?
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               MR. YALOWITZ: I expected them to focus on the 2000 to
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2004 period and not start in with 2007 and later periods 1 2 which --3 THE COURT: You want him to rebut the relationship in 2007? 4 5 MR. YALOWITZ: I want him to come back to 2004. THE COURT: Hasn't he already said that? 6 7 MR. YALOWITZ: Eviatar said it. 8 THE COURT: Somebody said it. 9 MR. YALOWITZ: The other thing I want him for, and 10 really it's just a moment or two, I want him to foundationalize 11 that video of Muhammad Dahlan saying we protected Hamas. 12 talked about that video. I want him to set the foundation for 13 him. 14 THE COURT: Why is that video now admissible? MR. YALOWITZ: The video is of Dahlan. 15 16 Exhibit 217, which we looked at. This is Dahlan during a 17 period when he is an employee of the defendants. 18 THE COURT: What period of time is that? 19 MR. YALOWITZ: Like 2001. 20 THE COURT: And he said what? 21 MR. YALOWITZ: He said we protected Hamas. 22 rebuts the testimony of Faraj that they didn't cooperate with 23 Hamas. 24 THE COURT: Didn't cooperate with Hamas on what? 25 My understanding was, and the reason I excluded the

video, is because the video was not commenting on what you want to use it for. The video was saying, look, we are the order in the West Bank and our responsibility is to protect all of the citizens of the West Bank and certain individuals who are — there are two types of individuals. There are certain individuals who Israelis tell us to arrest, and we do the arrests, or as you say, we don't do the arrests. We arrest them and let them go. But there are certain other individuals that the Israelis have targeted for assassination. It is our responsibility to protect everyone in the West Bank from assassination.

That is not part of the deal. So yes, we have the responsibility to protect the lives of the people in Hamas, just as we have the responsibility to protect the lives of other Palestinians. And if the Israeli government wants to arrest these people, then they should arrest these people. But they can't blow up their houses with them and their families in it because we have a responsibility to protect all of the Palestinians. That was my reading of the statement out of context.

You still want to use that to imply that they were saying that they were planning terrorist attacks together?

MR. YALOWITZ: I must be -- maybe I am misremembering this one, your Honor.

THE COURT: Maybe I am misremembering it. I thought

it was a video.

MR. YALOWITZ: This is one we showed the witness outside the presence of the jury because we thought it was inconsistent with his testimony which was that they were trying to arrest people from Hamas. His testimony was our job was to arrest all the Hamas guys. Then this wasn't his direct boss but it was the guy in Gaza who had the parallel title. I thought we showed it to him on the theory that if he had seen it, it would come in because it was inconsistent with his testimony.

THE COURT: Do we have it? Can we take a quick look at it. If it's the one I remember, it may have been the one you played for him. I know you played three.

MR. YALOWITZ: I think there was Tirawi Facebook page, which we said we weren't going to use. Then there were two videos, one of which was from a much later time period, and he didn't remember it and I think we concluded that that's just not going to come in. And then I thought this one, the issue was just foundationalizing its date.

Let's see if we can put it up on the screen.

THE COURT: While we are doing that, anything else he is supposed to rebut?

MR. YALOWITZ: The other thing is, we have the police statement by Ahmed Barghouti. Remember, Ahmed Barghouti is the Barghouti who took the engineer Abdullah Barghouti from the

prison to the safe house. And Ahmed, in his custodial statement, which I didn't offer in my direct case, made some comments about the release of -- said, on the day Abdullah was released, I got a call and went over to the prison and took him to the safe house.

THE COURT: How does that rebut?

MR. YALOWITZ: It's a third guy talking about the release issue.

THE COURT: What are you rebutting?

MR. YALOWITZ: The hearsay testimony that he escaped. Remember, Faraj slipped in this hearsay testimony, oh, I heard he escaped. We then unredacted the Abdullah Barghouti statement in which he said I was released. This is the guy that went and got him from the prison and he also says, he uses the word released in his statement.

I didn't offer it in direct because we had talked about the issue of the release and I had understood your views on that. So I want to offer this document in evidence. I just want to foundationalize it and put it in and say, here is another document saying he was released, another report.

THE COURT: My ruling was a little more limited than that. My ruling was that you had the right, once that witness said that he had escaped, to put Abdullah Barghouti's statement before the witness to ask the witness was he aware of the statement that he made that he was released. That was for

impeachment purposes. That was not for substantive evidence purposes.

So at that point I thought it was appropriate for you to cross-examine him with regard to that issue. But now you simply want to offer extrinsic evidence through this statement that was otherwise inadmissible through this witness, that was inadmissible prior to that witness's testimony, and its admissibility status hasn't changed. I don't know if I would have granted the application if you said you wanted to ask him and cross-examine him or try to impeach him with that statement.

MR. YALOWITZ: Let me do this with that document because I don't think you have seen it.

THE COURT: It was attached to your letter, wasn't it?

MR. YALOWITZ: 1147B? I'm not sure.

THE COURT: Maybe it was attached to their letter.

MR. YALOWITZ: So you have it, 1147B. Take a look at it.

If your ruling is you're not going to let it in -
THE COURT: You want to let it in now as substantive evidence of the fact that he was released.

MR. YALOWITZ: Right.

THE COURT: Because Ahmed said it during his, was it his interrogation?

MR. YALOWITZ: Correct.

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1 THE COURT: That doesn't change its hearsay nature. MR. YALOWITZ: I don't want debate. You know your 2 3 views on the hearsay issue. I think you know my view on the 4 hearsay issue too. 5 My view is it's part of his overall statement. You 6 have to look at it and draw that line. And if you have looked 7 at it and drawn the line, then I don't want to debate it with you. I didn't think you had seen it. 8 9 THE COURT: I had seen it even before that. MR. YALOWITZ: If you have ruled it's out, that's 10 We will move on. I didn't understand. 11 12 THE COURT: We discussed it specifically before. 13 MR. YALOWITZ: I know we have discussed it. 14 THE COURT: I know I have read it. 15 MR. YALOWITZ: You understand where I am with that. 16 You have got it. It's there. It says what it says. 17 THE COURT: That portion of it, as I say, I don't 18 think I am going to let you backdoor it, as they say, by trying 19 to get it in now as substantive evidence when it doesn't 20 qualify as substantive evidence. 21 MR. YALOWITZ: I understand your ruling on it. 22 THE COURT: It was within my discretion. I think I 23 gave you the appropriate leeway with regard to cross-examining 24 that witness about the basis for his saying this person was

released, particularly since he didn't have any personal

firsthand knowledge.

So I gave you that other document, let you ask him about it, and it's out there as something that is not consistent with his general impression that somehow this guy escaped.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ YALOWITZ}\colon$\operatorname{OK.\ I}$  understand your ruling on that. That's fine.

If I had understood it before, we wouldn't have gone through and around it.

THE COURT: Anything else that he is going to testify to before I hear from Mr. Rochon?

MR. YALOWITZ: A couple of other things.

There are a couple of dates I want him to nail down, just very short, that have kind of become relevant based on the defendants' case.

Number one, that this Operation Defensive Shield began on March 29, 2002. That's just a very basic fact.

Number two, that Abu Ali Mustafa was eliminated on August 27. It has become relevant because we have unredacted that.

THE COURT: We don't have that in evidence?

MR. YALOWITZ: Neither of those are in.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. YALOWITZ: There is one prisoner file where there was a translation issue.

Faraj, when he was shown the prisoner file of Majed al-Masri, said it looks like his mother is getting the money. THE COURT: Is he going to say something different? (Continued on next page) 

MR. YALOWITZ: No, no, he read it and he's going to show the jury exactly -- he's going to explain what that -- or pick word is that Faraj was claiming to translate, and he's going to link -- he's going to show to a fair-thee-well in a minute and a half that Faraj is -- that Al-Masri is the one getting the money, not his mother, not his wife.

THE COURT: It doesn't say mother?

MR. YALOWITZ: It doesn't say mother.

THE COURT: Why is that an expert opinion rather than a translation opinion?

MR. YALOWITZ: It's a translation. He knows how to translate.

THE COURT: But we have the translator who translated it and you had a guy sitting at the table who was agreeing or not agreeing with the translation. So where is there some evidence that is not what it means?

MR. YALOWITZ: So I can't put -- I can't -- it's their case, I can't bring a guy who is a translator and say wait a minute, this means such and such.

THE COURT: You can at the table because the guy was sitting right next to you. You're saying that that was not -- you want Shrenzel, who is not an expert in interpretation, to testify to that when nobody -- your expert never said that was an incorrect statement on the piece of paper?

MR. YALOWITZ: Wait a minute, we have got -- I want to

make sure we're talking about apples and apples. So the issue was not the words coming out of Faraj's mouth, those I didn't have a problem with the way they were translating.

THE COURT: But you said mother of the defendant.

MR. YALOWITZ: Right. And that was not correct, and I don't have any way of putting somebody on while he's testifying to say he's misreading the word. All I can do is --

THE COURT: You did. Well, I guess if it's not -- I mean I thought he gave us two portions on that document that referenced the mother.

MR. YALOWITZ: Well, that's why we need to clean it up, because it didn't reference the mother, and it's pretty obvious that it doesn't, and it's not going to take long to clean that up, and it goes to the guy's credibility.

THE COURT: What is it supposed to say?

MR. YALOWITZ: What it says is -- it says the detainee's or the prisoner's bank account -- it doesn't say the prisoner's mother, it says the prisoner's bank account, and then --

THE COURT: I think he said what was handwritten said the prisoner's mother, the mother of the prisoner.

MR. YALOWITZ: And that's incorrect, that's an incorrect reading of those words. That's not what those words say. They don't say the mother of the prisoner, they say the bank account of the prisoner. And Faraj wouldn't admit it

because he said the copy was illegible, and it really will not take long to clean this up.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. YALOWITZ: Yeah, two other things. One is in response to the Ashrawi testimony — and I don't know if you will let me do it, but Ashrawi came and said I'm for peace and I was there for Arafat in the 2002 period in Washington. What she didn't say is that as a result of Arafat's conduct, the President of the United States — because I started to ask her this question and you sustained the objection — the President of the United States decided that he would no longer deal with Arafat because, in the views of the United States government, Arafat was compromised by terror. And the President made that announcement in a speech on June 24.

THE COURT: Made an announcement that Arafat has been compromised by terror?

MR. YALOWITZ: Yes, he said I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leadership uncompromised by terror. So I would like to offer that to rebut the Ashrawi testimony.

THE COURT: The fact that he says I want new leadership uncompromised by terror, why does that necessarily mean that the old leadership was compromised by terror?

MR. YALOWITZ: Because that was the conclusion the White House reached in 2002.

THE COURT: I'm not going to allow that.

MR. YALOWITZ: Okay, fine. You understand what I'm offering it for.

THE COURT: No, I don't. I mean unless it's for improper purpose, then I understand it, but for a proper purpose, no, I don't understand it. You want him to testify that he heard that the President of the United States accused Arafat of being a terrorist? That's basically what you said to me.

MR. YALOWITZ: That the President reached that conclusion based on the evidence available to him.

THE COURT: And you think that's admissible for some purpose in this trial that makes it more or less likely that they were involved in the terrorist attacks?

MR. YALOWITZ: I think -- I didn't offer it in my case in chief. I did not expect that what we would have is bland generalizations from some minister without portfolio saying we were all for peace.

THE COURT: Why is that a surprise to you? It wasn't a surprise to me or anybody else in this room that there they were going come in here and say we are not terrorists, we didn't participate in terrorist acts, and we were negotiating peace and that was our intent. That was no big surprise to you. I'm sure you didn't expect them to say the opposite.

MR. YALOWITZ: I expected them -- I don't know what I expected them to do.

THE COURT: That's what I expected them to do.

MR. YALOWITZ: I didn't expect Ashrawi, until she came in the last minute and gave these bland generalizations — that's fine, she gave these bland generalizations, which I don't think are appropriate at all, on whether these six attacks were perpetrated by a PA employee acting within the scope of employment.

But now it's out there, and I think it's fair rebuttal to say well, when you went to the President -- when you went to the United States to give your bland generalizations, they didn't believe you, and they didn't believe you because they saw the evidence of what they were actually doing rather than the pretty words that you were coming to offer.

THE COURT: That's pretty loaded, that they saw the evidence of what you were actually doing. You have absolutely no one, Shrenzel or anybody, that can testify to that.

MR. YALOWITZ: Shrenzel is an expert. I have hearsay evidence.

THE COURT: Expert doesn't get you to say anything that you want to say.

MR. YALOWITZ: You understand my theory of it.

THE COURT: He can't testify to it.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's fine. The final thing is we had a lot of testimony in the defense case from Hussein Al-Sheikh, who came on video and said, among other things, you know, I was

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imprisoned for being in the PLO, and they had this guy on for a long time. And Al-Sheikh, on the day that Arafat died, issued a video statement, it was on video, saying basically force is the right path, force is the way to end the occupation, and I think that that is -- again, I didn't --THE COURT: Meaning what? You want to say that means that he says do terrorist bombings and shootings? MR. YALOWITZ: What I want to say is when he -- when he gave his testimony saying we're all for peace, that was in 2010, that's inconsistent with what he said back in 2004. THE COURT: But why is that rebuttal? Why isn't that the subject cross-examination if you thought there was a appropriate cross-examination? MR. YALOWITZ: I can't cross-examine a deposition. THE COURT: You mean the deposition. Well, you could have at the time when he said it, the witness, that you could have. MR. YALOWITZ: Whatever, somebody else could have. THE COURT: Not you personally.

I understand you mean the royal "you." MR. YALOWITZ:

THE COURT: Stepping in the shoes of the person.

MR. YALOWITZ: In fact, I think it was the subject of his deposition, and we could play that portion of his deposition in which he is shown the video, we'll show the video, and then we'll say okay, that -- let's show the video

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that -- he's shown a video, he's asked is that you, he says yeah, that's me, I said that. THE COURT: But other than impeachment, is there any other substantive purpose for that extrinsic evidence? It goes to the question -- it's fair --MR. YALOWITZ: if you say impeachment, cross-examination --THE COURT: It makes a difference. MR. YALOWITZ: It's a fair basis. THE COURT: For impeachment only. MR. YALOWITZ: To question his statements or the impression that the defendants want to leave that everything that Hussein Al-Sheikh was about was humanitarian assistance. And you remember we went back and forth. THE COURT: To further what argument, that he should not be believed, or further some argument about terror? MR. YALOWITZ: To go to the argument about terror. It's both, but I think --THE COURT: How does it go to whether it makes it more likely than not that the PA or the PLO was involved in these terrorist acts because he said in an announcement that I think we're going to have to resort to an armed struggle? MR. YALOWITZ: Because he's the guy who is requesting

MR. YALOWITZ: Because he's the guy who is requesting and -- we're requesting Arafat's approval to pay money to terrorists. So he write these letters saying, you know, please give \$2,000 to each of these three warrior brothers, and then

the defendants come and say no, they weren't warriors, they 1 2 were just strugglers, and so there's a debate about what was 3 his knowledge and intent when he asked for money for people 4 designated as terrorists. THE COURT: And you want to put in what evidence? 5 6 MR. YALOWITZ: It's just a video Al-Sheikh saying 7 Arafat stood for armed struggle. THE COURT: Have I seen this? 8 9 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't think we've offered it before. 10 THE COURT: Can I see it? MR. YALOWITZ: Yeah. We happen to have it ready. 11 THE COURT: Very good. This was not the subject of 12 13 his examination at deposition? 14 MR. YALOWITZ: It was. He was asked is that you, and he confirmed it was. 15 16 THE COURT: There were no substantive questions about 17 his motives or what he meant. MR. YALOWITZ: I don't think so. 18 19 (Video recording played) 20 THE COURT: You believe he's talking about terrorist 21 acts when he makes that statement publicly? 22 MR. YALOWITZ: I do believe that, yes. 23 THE COURT: He's not talking about a terrorist act, 24 he's not talk about a suicide bombing, he's not announcing in 25 this interview that he's asking people to do suicide bombings

and shootings. I assume that's not your argument.

MR. YALOWITZ: No, this is the day after Arafat died. He's reflecting on the legacy of Arafat.

THE COURT: But the fact that he made the statement after Arafat died, how is that substantive evidence that makes it more likely than not that the PA was involved, or the PLO?

MR. YALOWITZ: It goes to knowledge. It goes to knowledge.

THE COURT: Whose knowledge?

MR. YALOWITZ: The knowledge of Arafat and --

THE COURT: Arafat is dead.

MR. YALOWITZ: Right. So the knowledge of Arafat and Al-Sheikh, it goes particularly to his knowledge and the relationship between them in that one of my arguments is that the PA and the PLO, through Arafat, Al-Sheikh and others, provided material support to Al Aqsa Brigades in the form of money. That is a very simple argument. The jury needs to connect the dots between an Al Aqsa attack and Arafat knowingly provided material support to Al Aqsa, and among the issues is knowledge, and so —

THE COURT: Knowledge of what?

MR. YALOWITZ: Knowledge knowing material support, did they know that they were giving money to people who were engaged in terrorist activities in, admittedly, the period before --

THE COURT: How does this reflect that?

MR. YALOWITZ: So when the defendants offer testimony from a witness who was implicated in giving money to terrorists and they say see, he was just offering humanitarian aid, then they're saying he didn't know these people were terrorists. So when he makes a statement on television on the death of Arafat saying armed struggle is the best way to get rid of the occupation, then that supports the inference that when he was giving money to terrorists he understood that they were terrorists.

THE COURT: I understand your argument, but I'm not going to allow it. So that application is denied.

Is that pretty much it for Shrenzel?

MR. YALOWITZ: Yeah, there are two, right, two perpetrate -- two photos I want to offer with him that apparently we didn't put in a photograph of Marwan Barghouti.

THE COURT: I thought we did.

MR. YALOWITZ: I thought we did, too.

THE COURT: Didn't we show a photo of Marwan Barghouti to the jury?

MR. YALOWITZ: I thought we had, but I didn't find any record that has been admitted in evidence. I don't think it's going to be controversial. Then I also want a photo just to help the jury of the father of Mosaab Yousef so the jury can visualize the people.

1 THE COURT: The one talking about at the location where they were doing the arrests? 2 3 MR. YALOWITZ: Right. 4 THE COURT: Let me hear what portion Mr. Rochon 5 objects to. 6 You have one more? 7 MR. YALOWITZ: I think that's it. You want to see 217? 8 9 THE COURT: What did you want to do with it? 10 MR. YALOWITZ: Let's look at 217. 11 THE COURT: My recollection is a little vague. 12 (Video recording played). 13 THE COURT: That's it? 14 MR. YALOWITZ: That's it. 15 THE COURT: So you want this to stand for the 16 proposition that they were doing what with Hamas when they said 17 they were under the protection in the Gaza strip at that time 18 under the protective forces, security forces? 19 MR. YALOWITZ: That that rebuts the testimony of Faraj 20 that they were trying to arrest Hamas operatives. 21 THE COURT: But they did arrest Hamas operatives. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: Well, they arrested -- we know of one 23 that they arrested and released. 24 THE COURT: But it doesn't rebut that they were trying 25 to arrest Hamas operatives, but they weren't -- you conceded

that they were arresting Hamas operatives.

MR. YALOWITZ: It tends to support my theory of the case and rebut the defendants' theory of the case. The defendants' theory of the case is that they never had a good relationship with Hamas, they never had any cooperation with Hamas, they were always trying to arrest Hamas operatives. And my theory of the case is they had an on-again off-again relationship with Hamas, and there were times — and the intifada was one of them where they cooperated with Hamas and protected Hamas operatives.

THE COURT: And what protection do you say he's referring to, since I don't have anybody who is authenticating this statement?

MR. YALOWITZ: I think that the inference — the fair inference, and he says I'm giving the example of Gaza, because I don't want to go into what was going on in the West Bank, but I think the fair inference is both in Gaza and in the West Bank there were time when the preventive security force was protecting Hamas operatives.

THE COURT: In what way?

MR. YALOWITZ: By keeping them out of the hands of the Israeli authorities.

THE COURT: You mean by harboring a Hamas person that the Israeli government indicated that they were attempting to arrest?

MR. YALOWITZ: That would be one example, which is the example in our case.

THE COURT: What is the evidence of that in this case, or that you say supports --

MR. YALOWITZ: In this case we know -- the jury doesn't know, but we know that Jabril Rajoub, who was this guy's counterpart, took a Hamas bomb maker and gave him to Marwan Barghouti and he put him in a safe house. We know that.

THE COURT: And you think that's what is he referencing in this statement?

MR. YALOWITZ: I think that's among the things that he's referencing.

THE COURT: What gives you -- what makes you think that rather than want to think that?

MR. YALOWITZ: Because that's the evidence we have in this case of protecting a Hamas operative.

THE COURT: I understand. I still think that that's inadmissible. I think it's taken out of context. It's clear that's not what he is trying to say publicly. If he was, that would even be inconsistent with your theory that they're saying one thing and doing something else.

That's the whole problem with allowing public statements, they're inconsistent with your position that they're saying they're for peace but they are really behind terrorist attacks. Well, these are not statements saying we're

behind terrorist attacks, nor do you contend that they ever made any public statement that if they were anything they were mouthing public statements that they were in peace negotiations and they were trying to live up to the Oslo Accords, but it's that surreptitiously they were doing something different. This isn't the surreptitious part, this is the public part.

MR. YALOWITZ: I may have misremembered your ruling on this, or you may -- on reflection, it doesn't matter.

THE COURT: That's my position.

MR. YALOWITZ: I understand your ruling, that's fine.

Let's just move forward, that's fine.

THE COURT: Mr. Rochon, given the parts that I say that I don't think that we should get back into, what else do you specifically object to him testifying?

MR. ROCHON: I won't address anything in which you already ruled or have a firm opinion that it's out. I want to make sure that I cover everything, because I don't think there's any improper rebuttal on what's been said at all, but a couple are closer than other, I will admit.

On Tirawi, I don't know if the Court ruled that

Shrenzel can rebut Shrenzel, not the defense case, but however

one characterizes it, we do object to that. The testimony, in

reality, we heard a lot of things about this, last week

plaintiff's counsel was arguing that Tirawi had been pardoned

in 2003, now we are hearing -- but it's less specific as to the

date, what he said, and there are several answers here about when Shrenzel was testifying, he said Israel was not able to capture him.

THE COURT: That was my recollection.

MR. ROCHON: That is not a statement that is -- that's not consistent with how --

MR. YALOWITZ: Sorry, Mr. Rochon, who said that?

MR. ROCHON: Mr. Shrenzel, page 1514 of the transcript of this trial.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ROCHON: And he went on to clearly give the impression that anyone would have been left with that the only reason this guy wasn't charged is because they couldn't capture him.

In fact, were he captured by the Israelis, as we would really like to do, he would have been indicted. The impression was clear, the testimony in the defense case is not being rebutted here. In fact, what they're doing is offering Shrenzel the opportunity to I guess correct what he said. That's not rebuttal. The time for him to have corrected what he said was while he was on the stand under oath the first time, not to come in now and say something different.

THE COURT: Well, he didn't have to clear it up if you weren't going to dispute it.

MR. ROCHON: I kind of had to dispute it.

THE COURT: He would have let it rest if you hadn't come in and said that's not what happened. I guess he figured he wouldn't have to bother.

MR. ROCHON: He might not have had to bother, but I don't think the plaintiffs get to do a do over with their witness because they put on testimony that is inconsistent with what he said on direct. He's not going to come in and say it again, he's going to say the part about the reason that he wasn't charged is because we couldn't capture him, no, the reason is because we pardoned him or released him or changed our view. That's not proper rebuttal, so he should not be allowed to testify.

THE COURT: I understand your position -- and I think this is a close one, but I think I go in their direction on this one, mainly because I think the jury at this point -- if they want to change the issue with regard to Shrenzel's testimony from he didn't know what he was talking about to he deliberately misled you, then I'm sure that you have the sufficient skills to make that point in front of the jury if he wants to get up now and give testimony that is different than what he gave before. And I have specific instructions in my jury instructions with regard to witnesses that give testimony in one regard and give different testimony on a different occasion.

Frankly, in my view, that testimony, if he says that

in the way that Mr. Yalowitz is now proffering, it would be inconsistent with the testimony that he gave when he first got on the stand. And I think the jury should have the full opportunity, given the fact that you put in evidence that disputes what he said, for them to assess whether they think he was mistaken or he was deliberately misleading. I think that if he wants to call him for that purpose then he has to face further cross-examination and be confronted with the statements that he made and the fact that he never said that, and now he's here to say it now only because it was demonstrated that what he said was not true.

MR. ROCHON: I understand the Court's ruling. I think we do need a really specific proffer if the plaintiffs are going to try to get into why or how, A, he knows this new information and what levels of hearsay are behind it, or that he will offer, because --

THE COURT: It depends on what you think he's going to say. I don't think he has -- I think he's simply going to say that he agrees with you, that they didn't -- that they made an ultimate decision that they didn't want to arrest him. I don't think anybody disputes that. The question is not whether he's going to say that, if that's what they're going to call him for, the question is why didn't he say that when he first was on the stand and had a full opportunity to do so.

MR. ROCHON: I agree. My concern is I don't want to

have testimony that we haven't got a specific proffer on. If Mr. Yalowitz is going to try to ask him why did Israel decide not to arrest him, I don't think that this witness should get into hearsay that will again repeat out-of-court information implicating Mr. Tirawi in the guise of explaining Israel's decision not to charge him. So I would like to ask the Court if you could have Mr. Yalowitz give a proffer as detailed as the one I was giving on my --

THE COURT: What is he going to say?

MR. YALOWITZ: They had a policy change. He's not going to talk about -- I don't want him talk about -- I will instruct him not to talk about the evidence implicating Tirawi. I don't -- I think that's done. Whatever is in on that is in.

THE COURT: But is he going to say anything other than the change of policy was that they decided to say never mind, we don't -- we decided we don't want the guy? Is there some policy?

MR. YALOWITZ: I think that's enough.

THE COURT: Is there some other policy that you are going to elicit?

MR. YALOWITZ: No, I wasn't planning to.

THE COURT: Okay. He's going to say that they had a change of mind, they no longer wanted him, and he's going to say that ultimately after they did not find him, if that's what he meant to say, or they could not find him, when they did find

him, they decided that they didn't want him anyway, and that was their change in policy by the time they found him.

MR. ROCHON: I don't know if that's what the proffer is.

THE COURT: That's what I just heard.

MR. ROCHON: I don't know about this thing when they found him.

THE COURT: Not when they found him.

MR. ROCHON: I heard this 2003 date the other day from Mr. Yalowitz.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's not correct, 2003 -- look, the policy change was 2005, the 2003 I was relying -- frankly, I heard that testimony from Faraj, it was interesting testimony to me and I needed to investigate it. But Faraj on Mr. Rochon's questioning made it sound like 2003 was the key date. So I was going off of what Mr. Rochon's questions were. In fact, as I understand the facts, it's not 2003.

THE COURT: Well, you know what, the reality is I'm not particularly interested in limiting his testimony at all. I'm pretty much interested in what his explanation is for why he told the jury that he wasn't arrested because they couldn't find him, and now he's saying that oh, that's not true, they really just decided that they didn't want him, and if I gave you the impression that the only reason why he's not indicted and in an Israeli jail is because someone protected him from

the Israelis and they weren't able to do that, I'm sorry, that's not the impression I meant to give you. If he wants to say that, that's fine.

MR. ROCHON: I want to make sure there's no other hearsay that comes in from this guy about Tirawi or the decision making, because I think this is now more fact testimony than expert testimony.

THE COURT: No, I mean, as I say, I don't expect him to give us any new facts than he already testified to and that you already put in evidence on your case. He's going to say yes, that there did come a time that they decided they didn't want him, and I'm sure if you want to cross-examine him further, and that's your decision, he will be in a position to have to say yes, there was a significant period of time, probably right up until today, that, if they wanted him, they could have taken some efforts to get him, and they decided they no longer wanted him. There was a change in their position, and that is really the reason why he's not in prison today, not because they can't find him, because he's real easy to find.

MR. ROCHON: I understand the Court's ruling on that one.

THE COURT: The jury can assess, when they hear my instructions on expert witnesses, and they can evaluate him.

MR. YALOWITZ: Several other areas. He said to Majid Al-Masri, that's the guy whose prisoner of payment record was

shown to Faraj, and now the plaintiffs want to say that Faraj was wrong about how he read it. That ostensibly impeaches

Faraj, but they didn't do the critical step necessary before

impeachment, which is confront him with the claim that he was

translating improperly, even though they had a guy sitting

there or special request to sit at counsel table and never said

to Faraj: Isn't that wrong? Please explain.

That is what a witness is entitled to before they are impeached with this inconsistent evidence, and they did not that. They said this is a credibility cross. It's unfair to the witness to do that, especially when we went through all the machinations to make sure they were in the position to know what was being said. In fact, it's their document. They didn't have to rely on what the translator was saying, they had the document in front of them since the beginning of the case.

THE COURT: Was that portion of the document ever translated on the document?

MR. YALOWITZ: Yes.

MR. ROCHON: The document was translated, but not the handwritten portion that he was referring to.

THE COURT: The handwritten portion was not translated?

MR. YALOWITZ: No, it is, it is translated.

THE COURT: What does it say?

MR. YALOWITZ: It says the account of the prisoner.

THE COURT: That's how it's translated? 1 MR. YALOWITZ: Right. 2 3 MR. ROCHON: If we could, please, your Honor, if one 4 looks at their exhibit, the English version has a square with 5 writing inside of it, nothing on top. The Arabic version that 6 the witness looked at has writing on top of that square, which 7 is what the witness was referring Mr. Yalowitz to. THE COURT: But that writing was never translated in 8 9 the English version. 10 MR. ROCHON: In English version. 11 THE COURT: In the English version it wasn't 12 translated? 13 MR. ROCHON: Of the exhibit. 14 THE COURT: On the exhibit itself. 15 MR. ROCHON: Right. And go to page 9484. THE COURT: Is there a reason why that wasn't 16 17 translated? 18 MR. YALOWITZ: It was translated, he's just not reading it right. May I hand it up? 19 20 MR. ROCHON: Let me make sure I'm talking about the 21 same page. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: Page 9484, it says beneficiary's 23 account number, and in brackets, handwritten. 24 Let's try get our facts right here. 25 MR. ROCHON: So, Judge --

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THE COURT: You're saying the handwritten part says Bank of Palestine LTD. What are you saying is the handwritten? MR. ROCHON: Judge, if you look at that document and then advance forward, please, see the one on the right, that is the Arabic version, you see the handwriting? THE COURT: Yes, at the top. MR. YALOWITZ: It's not translated is what I said. Maybe I did get my facts right. Sometimes even a blind squirrel finds a nut. THE COURT: So --MR. ROCHON: Handwriting on the bottom. THE COURT: But the handwriting on the top is what he's referring to? MR. ROCHON: That's what the witness was referring to to Mr. Yalowitz. THE COURT: And that's not translated into English on document? MR. ROCHON: That's what it appears to me. MR. YALOWITZ: He's mistaken about that. THE COURT: Where is it translated into English? MR. YALOWITZ: It says beneficiary's account number, bracket, handwritten. THE COURT: Right, it says handwritten. So when you say handwritten, what is it supposed to say? What does it say? MR. YALOWITZ: The handwriting says beneficiary's

account number.

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THE COURT: That's what you say that the handwritten notation says?

MR. YALOWITZ: Right.

MR. ROCHON: And the witness says that it says something about beneficiary's mother.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. YALOWITZ: This writing about Bank of Palestine, that's Bank of Palestine.

THE COURT: But what are you saying that the witness will say that the top says?

MR. YALOWITZ: He will say it says beneficiary's account number.

THE COURT: Wasn't there also another notation where he says that said something about the mother?

MR. ROCHON: There's a separate page in the same exhibit where he referenced the mother as well.

MR. YALOWITZ: And that wasn't true either.

THE COURT: What is that supposed to say,

Mr. Yalowitz? Do we have that page?

MR. YALOWITZ: With respect to the other page, which is the fifth page of the document, it says beneficiary named Majid Al-Masri, relationship, the detainee himself, and Al-Masri -- I mean Faraj said well, that I can't read because it's illegible. So he didn't -- he wasn't willing to admit --

1 THE COURT: Is that translated? MR. YALOWITZ: 2 Yeah. 3 THE COURT: And is it in English? 4 MR. YALOWITZ: In English it says relationship, the 5 detainee himself. It's under item four, beneficiary name and relationship. 6 7 THE COURT: But he didn't -- there's no dispute as to the translation here. 8 9 MR. YALOWITZ: Well, apparently there is. 10 THE COURT: No, is there? 11 MR. YALOWITZ: As between the lawyers? 12 THE COURT: No, what do you say that he said was on 13 the page? 14 MR. YALOWITZ: He said he couldn't read it. THE COURT: He said he couldn't read it, but he didn't 15 16 say it says something different than what you translated. 17 MR. ROCHON: Judge, on the other document, which is still on the screen, there's also -- I'm not sure you can see 18 19 it through the screen in the courtroom, there's also some 20 handwriting on the bottom of the document. 21 THE COURT: Is that at issue? 22 MR. ROCHON: Well, what the witness was referring to 23 when he said it was Umm Hasan, Mr. Yalowitz was at the stand 24 with him so -- it wasn't on the screen for the witness to point 25 to where exactly he was reading this.

My point is that --

THE COURT: So are you arguing he was reading from the bottom?

MR. ROCHON: I'm arguing that he said it said Umm

Hasan, and most importantly, they didn't confront him with that

is not what it says, what you were reading is not what it says,

they didn't confront him with that.

THE COURT: They did confront him, he said is that what it says, and he said yes.

MR. ROCHON: He said doesn't it say detainee, his handwriting says Umm.

THE COURT: So they did confront him.

MR. ROCHON: But what they didn't confront him with was the idea was he misreading, and the witness is entitled to that.

THE COURT: They did confront him, they said doesn't it say something different than what you had translated. They said doesn't it say beneficiary, that's the very first question, and he said no.

MR. ROCHON: Mr. Yalowitz never questioned whether he was reading the words correctly. In fact, he backed off the examination.

THE COURT: Well, bottom line is that's what the document says, so I don't know how you could back away from what the document says. You are the one who wants to rely on

the fact that the document now says something different than what the translation says.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  ROCHON: I never asked him about the document, I wasn't going into this.

THE COURT: But your document doesn't say what he says it said.

MR. ROCHON: I don't know why the Court says that.

THE COURT: Because it says beneficiary, your translation, you don't have a translation that says what he said.

MR. ROCHON: He was pointing at some handwriting on the document.

THE COURT: And your responsibility, and I'm sure you thoroughly did so, was to make sure that everything that was translated in English was an accurate translation on the document. Otherwise, they slipped in "terrorist," right? I'm sure you made sure that that did not happen. So it was your responsibility, if you thought this was -- matter of fact, this is what impeaches him, it doesn't say what he says it says. The translation doesn't say that.

MR. ROCHON: If that's what impeaches him then we don't need a witness. The witness is going to be focusing not on that English translation but on the other one. So this isn't a question of what the English version says, it's a question on what the witness says on the Arabic version.

THE COURT: I will disagree with you. He can use this witness as well as a probably a number of witnesses to demonstrate that in Arabic it doesn't say what he says it says. And he can also emphasize to the jury that the English translation doesn't say what he says it says, if that's going to make any difference whatsoever in the jury's determination in this case.

MR. ROCHON: Understanding that, I would suggest to the Court there is other handwriting on this document that is clearly not the translated under anything.

THE COURT: Then you are stuck with it, aren't you?

You should have translated it if you wanted it translated. If
you want somebody now who wants to translate it, you can bring
them in.

MR. ROCHON: I don't think it's a big issue.

THE COURT: I don't either.

MR. ROCHON: But I don't want my witness impeached on a credibility point when he wasn't fairly confronted.

THE COURT: But he was confronted. He was shown the document. He was asked is this what it says, and said no. He gave his own view of what it says. What is he supposed to do after that, say: Are you sure? How is he supposed to confront him? He showed him the document, and Mr. Yalowitz demonstrated his shock when the guy said it says mother, because Yalowitz said to him wait a minute, where does it say that, and the

document before the jury didn't say that.

MR. ROCHON: Mr. Yalowitz actually did not say where does it say that. If he said that, then the witness would have pointed somewhere and we would have proper impeachment.

THE COURT: I'm not sure -- he was definitely asked, because he pointed out where it was that said mother of the person, and he pointed to it, and he showed Mr. Yalowitz where it said it.

MR. ROCHON: That's where I disagree with the Court.

Mr. Yalowitz stayed right here going back and forth with his

colleagues and did not go to the witness and say show me where

it says that.

THE COURT: Well, you can look at the transcript, but it was clear that the guy knew what he was being asked, he was saying that it said something different than what we know — everyone in this room knows what he said is not in the translation. It is not in the translation.

So if you thought that there was some misunderstanding, you could have asked him. It is not on the translation. That alone they could use to impeach him, because there's no translation of any document — and both sides knew that this document was translated, there's no translation of any document that says what he says it said.

MR. ROCHON: If Mr. Yalowitz wanted to use the English language to impeach him, I wasn't objecting, that's in

evidence, but we object to another witness coming in to impeach him when he wasn't adequately confronted.

THE COURT: Well, he was confronted sufficiently, so I'm going to -- since, one, he was asked on cross-examination, not on direct examination, number two, he was directly pointed to that -- and I have to look at the transcript, you can look at the transcript, and three, the portion that everybody else in this room thought said beneficiary account in handwriting, he's now saying says something different, and he was clearly confronted with it. He doesn't have to be accused of being a liar, he just has to show him document and that's what he confronts him with it. There's no secret of what he was being asked about.

So that they could ask him or anybody else who understands that language. And if you have an interpreter who wants to come in and say that's an accurate interpretation — because you're not even saying that, you can't fault them for the guy sitting next to them. Fine, you have plenty of people who speak Arabic, let them show you where it says that.

MR. ROCHON: I understand the Court's ruling.

The other things that were proffered, I want to cover them, but the plaintiffs said they want to introduce a photograph of Marwan Barghouti. There is one of him in already.

THE COURT: I thought there was.

MR. ROCHON: You allowed it in over objection of him 1 at a funeral procession or something, so they could do a still 2 3 from that. 4 THE COURT: It was a video? 5 MR. ROCHON: Yes. 6 THE COURT: I don't remember which video. Which one 7 is that? 8 MR. ROCHON: The one of him making statements and we 9 didn't win. THE COURT: That was offered on the case in chief? 10 11 MR. ROCHON: Yes. 12 THE COURT: I remember in general now. 13 MR. ROCHON: Then also there's a photograph of Yasser 14 Arafat holding a photograph of him, so that's in evidence. And 15 then the one they want to introduce is one of him in manacles. We don't need a photograph of Marwan Barghouti in manacles. If 16 17 they have a non-pejorative photograph of him not in manacles, 18 I'm not going to object. I don't think that's rebuttal, but --19 THE COURT: If that's the photo they want, and we 20 already have photos in, I won't let it in. 21 MR. YALOWITZ: We'll see if we can find one that is 22 agreeable to both sides. 23 THE COURT: The one already in evidence is the one 24 agreeable to both sides. 25 MR. YALOWITZ: Let me look and see, because there is a

video, it's a very degraded quality, we just want the jury to be able to see the guy's face.

MR. ROCHON: If we find a non-pejorative one, I won't make a big deal about that.

As far as the photograph of this fellow Mosab Hassan Yousef's father, that rebuts nothing. And that is such a side issue, the father of this guy, that putting in the rebuttal I think should not be allowed. Unlike Marwan Barghouti, it's part of this trial, whether we like it or not, you ruled his conviction comes in, there's been conversation about him. This guy's father --

THE COURT: There's been conversation about him, too.

MR. ROCHON: Very little. He's said to be a Hamas person, and putting in his photo to prove what?

THE COURT: He was the person that did the negotiations supposedly to -- isn't it, about how he's going to be arrested?

MR. ROCHON: It rebuts nothing.

THE COURT: I thought there was some testimony about that on cross.

MR. ROCHON: There was some testimony about --

THE COURT: And you read in the deposition portion.

MR. ROCHON: I read in the deposition, but it rebuts nothing what the father looks like.

THE COURT: It's not that big a deal for me. I don't

think it makes any difference.

MR. ROCHON: When something is not a big deal -- I didn't object to something that is not a big deal, if they want Marwan Barghouti --

THE COURT: This one you want to keep out.

MR. ROCHON: Yes, because it's a distraction from the issues in this case.

THE COURT: Fine. Unless Mr. Yalowitz has some strong argument to make as why it is compelling to get this photo in front of the jury, I am not going to let him do it at this time if you object.

MR. YALOWITZ: Let me just say really what I want to do is no secret. This deposition testimony is useful to my case. I just want to have photographs of the players so that the jury can understand who the different people are.

THE COURT: I understand what you want to do, and I don't think there's anything illegitimate about it except that he's right, this is an afterthought now, and it's not proper rebuttal. It's not. So if he objects to it, I will give him technically that foul and you get a free foul shot.

MR. YALOWITZ: Fine. I can do it with a shadow, I can illustrate it without a photo.

THE COURT: Maybe you can trade him off something else.

MR. YALOWITZ: Since we're so close to each other.

MR. ROCHON: They said they wanted to move in the date of the beginning of Operation Defensive Shield. There was testimony that it was late March, but if he wants to get specifically March 29, I don't think there's been testimony of March 29 yet. If somebody says Operation Defense Shield starts March 29, I don't think it rebuts anything, but frankly it doesn't matter.

THE COURT: If you want to stipulate to those dates, you can do so and save us all time.

MR. ROCHON: If he doesn't testify otherwise, I will stipulate to when ODS started.

Abu Ali's Mustafa's date of assassination I think is in evidence.

MR. YALOWITZ: I don't recall that.

MR. ROCHON: I don't think that it rebuts anything in the case.

THE COURT: If you could find where it's in the record and it's clear, show Mr. Yalowitz and maybe we don't need to go through it again.

MR. ROCHON: Then finally, your Honor, I think that covered everything that you haven't already excluded, except he said something about wanting to put on Shrenzel on the hostile friendly relationship with Hamas, and you asked is that anywhere in his report, and the answer is no, Shrenzel did not include in his report that. And I don't think it's proper

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rebuttal given the proffer that we have here to have Shrenzel come in here and start re-opining on that. The evidence on this -- in the plaintiff's case in chief there was evidence on this. Having Shrenzel come in and give opinions on this that weren't in his report and weren't disclosed as rebuttal evidence is improper rebuttal. THE COURT: I didn't know -- other than the video, what is he going to say in substance? MR. YALOWITZ: He will say that --THE COURT: Ouote him word for word. MR. YALOWITZ: Yes, it was a very good relationship during this time period and --THE COURT: I thought he already said that. MR. YALOWITZ: Eviatar said that, Eviatar said --THE COURT: That was the subject that the Eviatar expert used, that was not the subject of Shrenzel's expertise. MR. YALOWITZ: It is a subject of his expertise. added this Hamas lexicon. We didn't offer him on that topic. THE COURT: Did he opine about that in his report? MR. YALOWITZ: He did not. THE COURT: We won't go back there. If Eviatar is --MR. YALOWITZ: Frankly it's like a really small thing,

this Sheik Yassin. I was going to do the Dahlan video, which

you said was out. It's very short, and I'm trying to not have

two guys and a Hebrew translator.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I would even let it in as rebuttal from the other guy, because the other guy is the one qualified to testify about it. I think to the extent that he testified about the relationship of Hamas, and to the extent they put on testimony in response to that, for him to get back up there and repeat the same things is not rebuttal.

MR. YALOWITZ: 20-second time out on this. I want you to be sure, because I think we're down to a very small thing, and --

THE COURT: I agree, but it still may be important.

MR. YALOWITZ: It may be important, but it's not going to be a lot of time. And the issue is this --

THE COURT: Time is not the essence.

MR. YALOWITZ: The issue is this, if your ruling is I don't want him to talk about Sheik Yassin because I don't want anybody to talk about Sheik Yassin. Okay, if that's your ruling, then we'll move on. If your ruling is I want Eviatar to talk about it instead of Shrenzel, I need to understand that so I can deal with that.

THE COURT: You want to impeach this other witness because he said that the circumstances of this photo was that the guy was old, released from prison, blind and on his death's door. Now I mean so you want to bring in some expert to say — some expert on the Middle East to say it's my opinion that this guy wasn't ready to die, you got a doctor who could say that?

This guy doesn't say that. Come on, give me a break. This guy is not qualified to say that.

MR. YALOWITZ: It's not his health.

THE COURT: It is his health.

MR. YALOWITZ: The health of political leaders is important to people, and the testimony is not his blood pressure was low that kind of stuff, the testimony is he was at the height of his powers, and so when --

THE COURT: He wasn't at the height of his physical powers because the jury could see from the photograph the guy is sitting in a wheelchair looking dazed.

MR. YALOWITZ: Okay, that's opinion, but the testimony is when Yasser Arafat gives the guy a kiss --

THE COURT: That was the kiss of death? Is that the question? Come on, let's focus here.

MR. YALOWITZ: What I want to understand is this is something that I want to address. If you say don't address that, we'll move on.

THE COURT: I will explore as deep as I can what you say the relevance is and this guy is not qualified, nor is it appropriate rebuttal for him to come in and say no, this guy wasn't dying, so Yasser Arafat must be kissing him because he loves him. That's not what this case is about, and think it's waste of time. It's an issue that is not appropriate for rebuttal, given the nature of the testimony. And I don't know

if he could in fact dispute any statement that this witness made. He may want to dispute the implication, but I don't think he's here to dispute, one, whether the guy had just been released from prison, two, whether the guy was in a wheelchair, three, whether the guy was in bad health, four, whether the guy was half blind, five, whether the guy had a significant physical condition which —

MR. YALOWITZ: It's not his physical condition. I want you to tell me where you are on it.

THE COURT: Where I am --

MR. YALOWITZ: It's not his physical condition, it's his political condition.

THE COURT: What he will say about that?

MR. YALOWITZ: That he was still a strong, important leader for Hamas.

THE COURT: We assume that's true since Yasser Arafat is kissing him on the cheek.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's a natural inference.

THE COURT: That's what you want to argue from that, despite what his health was, he didn't kiss everyone who was on death's door. I mean he picked this guy and posed pictures with him, I assume it's supposed to show that there's some reconciliation if not greater affection between these two individuals. You can argue whatever you want, but this expert can't tell me whether they're buddy buddy or not because he

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kissed him on the cheek.

MR. YALOWITZ: All I need you to say is -- when you say this expert, you mean Eviatar or Shrenzel? Because I don't want to screw around and bring Eviatar.

THE COURT: I mean Eviatar or Shrenzel.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's all I wanted to understand.

THE COURT: Focus what you want from this guy, get him in, get him off. You have to find out if he's available tomorrow.

MR. YALOWITZ: We'll figure it out.

THE COURT: So when they rest, he's ready to go.

MR. ROCHON: And it's Tirawi we talked about, the form we talked about, and then we'll either work out these dates or he'll say the two dates.

THE COURT: Right. Is there any chance we can shut this down by lunchtime tomorrow?

MR. YALOWITZ: Marwan.

MR. ROCHON: And a photo of Marwan, but Judge, we've got photos of Marwan. Oh, if you get a new photo.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROCHON: I didn't see the witness on that. We'll stipulate. I know what the guy looks like, I don't need him to foundationalize photos of Marwan Barghouti.

MR. YALOWITZ: I want us to pause and note that we may actually offer an exhibit in evidence that the defendants don't

object to.

MR. ROCHON: That happened many times.

MR. YALOWITZ: Before we move off witnesses, Judge, there's one other thing, which is they're talking about bringing at least one witness who has a criminal record, Khaled Abu Al-Yaman. They have given me --

THE COURT: Is he one of the three?

MR. YALOWITZ: Yes. They have given me some information about his criminal history. Depending on what he says, I may ask him some questions about his criminal history, and I want to make sure if they have an application about that, they deal with it.

THE COURT: Do you know something that they don't?

MR. YALOWITZ: I don't know what they know about his criminal history.

THE COURT: You know something more than what they have given you?

MR. YALOWITZ: I believe I do.

THE COURT: And you have a good faith basis to pose a question to this witness with regard to his credibility?

MR. YALOWITZ: Indeed I do. I should say I might. It depends on what he says.

THE COURT: I'm not sure why it would depend on what he says.

MR. YALOWITZ: Because when I say what were you

convicted of, if he doesn't say what I know, then I will confront him about it.

MR. ROCHON: So we don't have it. The plaintiffs disclosed no convictions to us. We disclosed what we're aware of.

THE COURT: And you don't want to give them a heads up on this one?

MR. YALOWITZ: I don't.

MR. ROCHON: Well, Judge --

THE COURT: This is the way we're going to proceed:
You bring your witness. If you decide that you're going to
want to ask him that question, then you ask for a side bar or
we do it out of the presence of the jury. I will hear what it
is that you think you want to ask him, and if you're not
willing to disclose it to them now, I will make a determination
at that point whether you should have the opportunity to ask
the witness the question and see if he admits it or denies it,
depending on what you -- how you say that conviction may go to
his credibility.

MR. ROCHON: Judge, two things. First of all, it's discoverable if they have such a thing. Second, we're entitled to take the sting out of prior convictions.

THE COURT: It's not discoverable if he asked you for his prior convictions and you didn't tell him. It's not discovery. If you didn't represent -- if he did not represent

to you that he had an additional conviction and they think that they have good faith basis to ask that, you don't have the right to have them warn you that they're going to catch your guy in a lie when he gets on the stand.

So you better warn your guy that they think that they have something more than you what you disclosed to them, so if he forgot something, he better think long and hard and let you know, because it could come up, if he's asked about his prior convictions, and the only stuff that he gives up is the stuff that you give me, and they're going to have to show me what the good faith basis is for them to ask that question and whether or not he does have a conviction.

(Continued on next page)

MR. ROCHON: Here is my conundrum. 1 With other witnesses the plaintiffs have objected to us bringing in their 2 3 prior convictions by the Israelis. 4 THE COURT: And you may object to this. 5 MR. ROCHON: If they are going to use convictions, I 6 want to ask him on direct about his convictions. Previously 7 they have objected. THE COURT: You can ask him about his convictions on 8 9 direct if you want. 10 MR. ROCHON: In the past they objected to that. 11 are all Israeli convictions. In the past they have objected 12 because it was injecting an issue that you didn't like. 13 THE COURT: What is the conviction you have disclosed 14 to them? 15 MR. ROCHON: We sent an e-mail to them last night. THE COURT: Was he convicted of throwing rocks at a 16 17 tank or convicted of participating in some violent act? MR. ROCHON: It's not a violent one. 18 19 THE COURT: Does it go to his credibility? 20 MR. ROCHON: Not in my view. It's protest activity or 21 illegal organization or something like that. 22 THE COURT: He was convicted of something? 23 MR. ROCHON: Throwing stones, organizing protests. 24 THE COURT: I had it right, convicted of throwing 25 stones.

1 So you want to bring out the fact that he was convicted of throwing stones? 2 3 MR. ROCHON: Previously the plaintiffs, if I was going 4 to do that before -- we are all topsy-turvy now. Before they 5 said I can't do that because that shows the Israelis lock up 6 guys for a long period of time for dumb stuff. Now, they are 7 saying they want to use something. All I am saying is if they are going to use a conviction, I want to bring this thing out. 8 9 THE COURT: You want them to bring out the fact that 10 he was convicted of throwing stones? 11 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't have a problem with him 12 testifying truthfully about what he was convicted of. 13 THE COURT: On his direct examination. 14 MR. YALOWITZ: I don't have a problem with it, as long as it's truthful. 15 THE COURT: You will have to make a judgment. 16 17 MR. ROCHON: Then, of course, they will proffer that 18 it's in the last ten years. 19 MR. YALOWITZ: It's not in the last ten years. 20 THE COURT: I don't know what they are going to 21 proffer. They haven't told me what it is. 22 MR. ROCHON: I take we are impeaching for credibility 23 with a prior conviction. 24 THE COURT: I don't know if we are even going to get 25 do this.

MR. ROCHON: I am just saying they can't even ask him if it doesn't meet the requirements for prior convictions.

Rochon, that's fine and dandy, but it's not until he comes up to me and says, I want to ask him X. And I am going to say, what was he convicted of and when was he convicted? And what do you want to ask him and tell me how it goes to his credibility. If they convince me, and it's particularly something that he has not disclosed on his direct examination, or even disclosed to you because you have not disclosed it to the other side, then I will make a judgment at that point in time. But otherwise it's much ado about doing.

MR. ROCHON: OK.

THE COURT: I just want to address some issues now so we can get them out of the way and then we can adjourn for the day and we can talk again tomorrow.

I am just looking at the letters that I got. I don't think there are really any more evidentiary issues.

MR. YALOWITZ: May I just raise one thing before we move off this?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. YALOWITZ: Because it's going to get late in Israel and I just want someone to notify Shrenzel to be ready.

What time do we hope to get going in the morning? Do we maybe want to start a little early?

THE COURT: I expect that we should be starting as early as 10 with the witnesses, and I expect you should be prepared for your having to put on your rebuttal case as early as noon.

MR. YALOWITZ: I was hoping we might even do it earlier than that. We will try to have him ready by 10 because the defendants may decide, based on their gut feeling, that they don't want to put these witnesses on.

THE COURT: You may decide you don't want to put on a rebuttal.

MR. YALOWITZ: So let's try to do it between 10 and 12:30.

THE COURT: You have a better feel than I do of what the direct and cross is going to be.

There are some arguments with regard to summations. We can discuss that tomorrow.

Let me just address a couple of things. I will give you some guidance.

You can argue to me whether or not the evidence is sufficient if you want to be heard further tomorrow when you rest and we send the jury home, but I don't have in the abstract a position that they can't attempt to argue that Abdullah Barghouti was provided to Hamas. If he was the guy in jail, in their custody, and if they think a reasonable inference can be drawn by the jury, based on the facts of this

case, that he was released so he could make future bombs and bombing attacks, and after his release he subsequently was involved in such activity on behalf of Hamas and Hamas needed a bomb maker, and he could demonstrate that he was the perpetrator — there is not much issue about that with regard to the Hebrew University bombing — I think they have the right to argue that they provided what was an essential material support, which was the guy who could make a bomb. Since they did have him in their custody and control, they did not have to release him to Hamas. If the jury finds they released him to Hamas so Hamas can use him as a bomb maker, that's a factual dispute that the lawyers can argue to the jury based on the evidence.

I am not sure I understand the argument with regard to, quote, terrorism premium or something that amounts to punitive damages. To the extent I recollect the testimony, the plaintiff can argue that the plaintiffs suffered and they suffered injury that should be compensated, and they suffered greater injury because it was a terrorist attack than they may have suffered, as they testified, if there had been some other attack. If the jury gets to that point and they logically feel that these people suffered greater because it was a terrorist attack than they would have suffered had it been some other accident or intentional murder, then I think it's within the realm of the argument to what extent the jury should assume

from the facts that their injury is compensable in damages in a greater amount than if it had been an accident or they had been a victim of some random crime.

MR. ROCHON: I understand the court's ruling and the evidence on it. The argument though may seem like a subtle distinction, but it's one that we think is important. The plaintiffs may not argue that the jury should award more to, quote, teach the defendants a lesson or send a message.

THE COURT: I agree.

MR. ROCHON: Those kinds of things that you normally see in punitive cases.

THE COURT: To the extent he says it's related to their assessment of the witnesses and how they testified and what damages they said they suffered, they did put in evidence in this case that it was significantly more hurtful that it was a terrorist attack that these individuals or their relatives died or were injured by than it would have been a car accident.

MR. ROCHON: I understand. Ours is a more limited point.

THE COURT: I think that's the way I would limit it.

Let me go to the redactions and get rid of those. The salah one and salah two should be redacted.

The senior official in the Yemenite Army should be redacted.

The deputy commander of the Palestinian Navy should be

redacted.

The chairman of the authority, Arafat, should be redacted.

This was all consistent with other redactions that have been made.

I don't have a recollection about the Israeli military court record of Nasser Shawish. What was the dispute about that?

MR. SATIN: The issue with this one is there was a trial in this case, and then midway through the trial the defendant started making statements, incriminating statements. Based on those in-court statements, he was then convicted. That was the basis of the conviction. And as a result, the plaintiffs were allowed to admit into evidence the indictment for which he was charged and ultimately convicted of.

THE COURT: Why are we discussing this issue again now? Didn't I already rule?

MR. SATIN: I don't know if this issue had been discussed before. Now we have got these proposed redactions from the plaintiffs and it did not include redactions of the trial testimony and that trial testimony did not form the basis of the conviction.

THE COURT: You are just objecting to it because you say it's irrelevant; it's not consistent with the nature of the redactions you were making before with regard to redacting

names and references to individuals who have been accused by third parties.

MR. SATIN: As far as I know, this is the only situation we have encountered where there is actual trial testimony about that issue as opposed to either a verdict from the court or just a guilty plea and the indictment that attached to that guilty plea.

THE COURT: I think I looked at the references and I am not sure -- I understand, I think, your grounds for objection. I just don't understand why you're objecting. What is it that you think you don't want the jury to hear?

MR. SATIN: The questions and answers of witnesses during that trial.

THE COURT: What question and answer? What is the prejudicial question and answer?

MR. SATIN: Part of the concern is it's not clear who the declarant is, but there is testimony --

THE COURT: I thought these were statements by the defendant. No?

MR. SATIN: The part that we are seeking to redact is not the statement of the defendant, but the statement of witnesses who testified during the trial. But ultimately the conviction of the defendant wasn't based on that testimony. It was based on statements the defendant made mid-trial. In other words, he decided — and I think he was unrepresented in the

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said.

case -- he decided to start blurting things out in the middle 1 of the trial. Based on those things he said in the middle of 2 3 the trial, the court convicted him, and the indictment as a 4 result of that was admitted in evidence. THE COURT: 5 Which exhibit are you referencing? 6 MR. SATIN: 382G. 7 THE COURT: 382G is an examination of witnesses. 8 MR. SATIN: Correct. 9 THE COURT: What is it that you wanted to redact? 10 MR. SATIN: The direct examination and 11 cross-examination. 12 THE COURT: Of who? These are all witnesses who are 13 not the defendant. 14 MR. SATIN: Correct. 15 Beginning on the third page, which at the bottom it says 76, you see where it says "defendant," and this is where 16 17 the defendant starts making statements, and then again on the 18 next page. 19 THE COURT: 76? 20 MR. SATIN: Correct. 21 THE COURT: Is this the defendant's statement? 22 the bottom is the defendant's statement. 23 MR. SATIN: We don't believe, according to the court's 24 rulings, that it would be proper to redact what the defendant

That's why we are not seeking that redaction. We are

seeking only the redaction of witnesses who testified during 1 that trial which did not form the basis of the conviction. 2 3 THE COURT: So that's defense witness number 3 and 4 defense witness number 4? 5 MR. SATIN: Correct. 6 THE COURT: That's not part of testimony, 78. 7 MR. SATIN: 78 is what the defendant said. So you're talking about? 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. SATIN: All the testimony on 74, all the testimony 10 The testimony on 76 until the last three lines, which 11 is when the defendant is speaking. Then the testimony on page 12 77 up until the last four lines where it says defendant. 13 THE COURT: I understand what you're saying. 14 This was a trial, not a plea. 15 MR. SATIN: It was a trial that became a plea. Because of the statements he made during the trial, it became 16 17 effectively a plea. 18 THE COURT: Did he plead guilty? Did he say, I am 19 quilty of this charge? 20 MR. SATIN: Yes. 21 MR. YALOWITZ: No. 22 MR. SATIN: Depends what you mean he pled guilty. 23 THE COURT: Its common sense meaning. 24 MR. SATIN: If you look at page 77 --25 Did he enter formally a plea of guilty, THE COURT:

yes or no? Or did he just admit the facts that constituted his guilt?

MR. SATIN: He made all kinds of admissions, and then prosecutor asked the court to convict him based on those admissions.

THE COURT: So that's not a plea of guilty.

MS. ROMEO: If you look at page 80 it says, we convict the defendant of the crime.

THE COURT: It's not a plea of guilty; it is a jury judgment. Just like parties would come before me and say, judge, we want to preserve our right to object to the suppression rules. So we will stipulate that you can convict my client on this record so we can preserve our right. Because if we plead guilty we don't preserve that right, but if you convict us by a bench trial, we preserve that right. If I go along with that, I look at the record, I convict him based on the stipulated facts. In this case, he was convicted by the court.

MR. SATIN: The trial didn't finish.

THE COURT: He didn't enter a plea of guilty. He was found guilty, right?

MR. SATIN: Based on what he said during the trial.

THE COURT: He was found quilty by the court.

MR. SATIN: Yes.

THE COURT: He did not plead guilty.

1 MR. SATIN: That is correct. THE COURT: He did not relieve the court of its 2 3 independent obligation to find that the facts established his 4 quilt. 5 MR. SATIN: Correct, based on what he said. 6 THE COURT: That's why they had the witnesses. 7 The witnesses preceded what he said. MR. SATIN: 8 THE COURT: OK. Is there some reason why the 9 witnesses' testimony is admissible? 10 MS. ROMEO: Well, your Honor, if you look at page 77, 11 for example, witness number 4 actually talks about knowledge in 12 connection with the attack involving Mohamed Hashaika. 13 THE COURT: He says he doesn't have a clue who Mohamed 14 Hashaika is. 15 MS. ROMEO: If you look at page 77 for witness number The first two do say, I only know what I know from the 16 television. But if you look at 77, he says, I took Mohamed 17 Hashaika to the checkpoint. Blank took Hashaika to the 18 19 checkpoint, introduced him to me, etc. 20 THE COURT: So what is the hearsay exception? 21 MS. ROMEO: In these documents we have only been 22 redacting the names of --23 THE COURT: What is the hearsay exception that makes 24 this admissible for the truth? 25 MS. ROMEO: This is a judgment of conviction.

1 THE COURT: The transcript isn't a judgment. 2 MS. ROMEO: A self-inculpatory statement. 3 This is what we have been dealing with all along. 4 have got statements in these documents, self-inculpatory 5 statements, where we have been redacting --6 THE COURT: What is the statement you need? 7 MS. ROMEO: We would like to keep in defense witness number 4. 8 9 THE COURT: Why? Because he is saying what? 10 MS. ROMEO: It's Abdel Karim Aweis. 11 THE COURT: Why is that important? 12 MS. ROMEO: He is discussing his involvement, which is 13 corroborated by his conviction. 14 THE COURT: What does it have to do with the 15 defendant's involvement? MS. ROMEO: They are saying that he met Hashaika at 16 17 the checkpoint. THE COURT: What is he saying about the defendant? 18 Who is the defendant in this case. 19 20 MS. ROMEO: This Nasser Shawish. 21 THE COURT: He is not saying anything about Shawish. 22 Does he reference Shawish? 23 MS. ROMEO: Give me one moment, your Honor. 24 It's a mistake in the redaction. If you look under 25 witness 4, the question that says, What was my connection with

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the terrorist attack carried out by Hashaika? The name is blacked out but the answer is Nasser. He is saying Nasser Shawish took Hashaika to the checkpoint. THE COURT: Does Shawish say that? Yes. So it's all corroborated. MS. ROMEO: Why do you need this witness? THE COURT: This document has been in evidence for MS. ROMEO: weeks. We discussed this document with defendants, and what was redacted in accordance with those discussions was on page So they are just going back and forth on this. THE COURT: I don't think we ever discussed the statement by other witnesses during the trial. On that point, if I may just raise it, my MS. ROMEO: recollection is that back in December, when we first started talking about these redactions, Mr. Satin made an argument concerning Shawish's documents. I could go back and check. This is probably the second or third time this issue has come up. Did you address it and did I address it? THE COURT: Yes. And I can look back. MS. ROMEO: THE COURT: What did I say? MS. ROMEO: I believe it was in December, that these statements did not have to come out. I don't have a recollection of discussing THE COURT:

statements that were in the reports that were witness

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F2H8SOK3 statements that were not statements of the defendant who pled quilty or was convicted. MS. ROMEO: I think it was a more general discussion. THE COURT: Quite frankly, this is the first time that I have a recollection of ever even knowing that what was included in there was independent testimony of third party witnesses. MS. ROMEO: We definitely talked about the facts that there were counts in which Shawish was convicted and not convicted. The defendants did make an argument that statements didn't support the conviction should come out, which is exactly what Mr. Satin is saying right now, because he was convicted on the basis of his indictment. THE COURT: I agreed with that.

MS. ROMEO: Our position is that that statement should stay in.

THE COURT: As I say, I have given you all of the redacted statements of the witnesses who pled guilty and were convicted. I think you should take out the statements by others who, quite frankly, I don't even have a clue as to who these people are.

MS. ROMEO: Does that include --

MR. YALOWITZ: Wait a minute. We have gone on and on and on about these redactions.

THE COURT: It's going to stop today. I don't want to

hear any more about redactions. This is it. Take out the 1 2 defense witnesses' testimony. 3 Is that including Abdel Karim Aweis? MS. ROMEO: 4 THE COURT: No. If it's a statement by the defendant, 5 you can leave it in. MS. ROMEO: I understand that. But defense witness 6 7 number 4, who is Abdel Karim Aweis, discusses Nasser Shawish, who is independently convicted and is corroborated. 8 9 THE COURT: And you have his conviction somewhere 10 else. 11 MS. ROMEO: It's in evidence. 12 THE COURT: You have the same stuff someplace else, 13 the same statement by him, right? MS. ROMEO: I would have to double-check the 14 conviction, but I believe that's the case. 15 16 THE COURT: We don't need it here as testimony. 17 MS. ROMEO: If there is something we need, we will 18 come back to you. 19 THE COURT: Take out the things that are referenced to 20 defense witnesses. 21 I think we already talked about Ahmed's statement. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: I just want to be really clear because 23 we have had more salami tactics with these redactions than I 24 have seen in just about anything else in this case. That's it 25 on redactions?

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1 THE COURT: That's it. MR. YALOWITZ: Done, finished, no more redactions. 2 3 THE COURT: That's it. 4 MR. YALOWITZ: Can we make sure the defendants 5 understand that? 6 THE COURT: They speak English. 7 MR. YALOWITZ: I would just like them to say we 8 understand the ruling. 9 THE COURT: I don't care whether they understand it or 10 not. That's it. Unless they tell me at this moment there is 11 something else you guys didn't resolve. I am not going to hear 12 any more about redactions, unless you guys agree that you made 13 some inadvertent error and you agree to do something. 14 I am still working on the jury instructions. Let me 15 just go to two things because I can use some guidance between 16 now and tomorrow. 17 I am not sure I understand the legal basis for your objection, Mr. Yalowitz, with regard to respondeat superior, 18 19 and, quite frankly, I remember you saying you don't want it in 20 furtherance of their interest or activities, but I remember we 21 had a specific discussion and you asked me to take out the 22 reference to business, commercial or noncommercial. So you 23 can't have it both ways. 24 It's clear that the law requires that they act in

furtherance of the employer's business activities, commercial

or noncommercial. In this case, it's not business activities. It's really their interest or the activities that are in furtherance of the PA's business, particularly to the extent that you say that it is within the scope of their business, or their interest as I call it, to do terrorist acts.

I am willing to consider, which I don't think is necessarily helpful to you, but I am willing to consider putting back in business or putting in activities or putting in interest. But you cannot convince me, without the employer acting in furtherance of one of those, that you could establish liability.

In light of your suggestion, I have rewritten the respondent superior section, and I have basically went straight back to the PJI -- not your version of it, not my version of it -- and I have taken some case law at the end that I think is appropriate.

Now, again, I think it's clear for this jury if I talk in furtherance of the PA's interest or in furtherance of the PA's activities rather than their business, but we can discuss that further. But I think it's important for me to add some language that I think lets the jury know the distinction between respondeat superior and any other direct liability. And I think it's the last paragraph that I have taken out of the case law, which basically says that it is not sufficient that the employee was engaged in the employer's service at the

time of the incident giving rise to the action. The test is whether the employee's act was in furtherance of the employer's business and was incident to the performance of duties entrusted to the employee. Where the employee's act was committed solely for personal end rather than in furtherance of or incident to the employer's business, the employer will not be held liable.

I think that's the distinction to be drawn between any direct liability. I don't care how to characterize it to the jury. I think it is legally accurate to characterize it that they have to act in the employer's interest, whether that be business interest or other interest. In this case, I think it's a little awkward to basically say that the PA -- regardless of what you claim is their activity -- that the PA is, quote, in the business of terrorism. There is no such business. There is only those people who are involved in those kinds of activities or those people who have those kinds of interests.

It seems to me that this is a very narrow -- as a matter of fact, defense lodged an objection to respondeat superior. So I think it's a very narrow, legally appropriate theory, if that's the way you want to go. But it only applies to those instances where the terrorist bomber or shooter was acting in the scope of the employer.

You can look at this and you can tell me whether you

want me to go back to the way I phrased it, or phrase it in one of the other ways, but you're not going to avoid "in furtherance" language. You are going to have to live with some "in furtherance" language. Otherwise you do not have such a separate theory.

MR. YALOWITZ: I want to read it carefully. I don't want to just answer on the fly.

THE COURT: I took it almost word for word out of the PJI.

MR. YALOWITZ: I read the cases. I know what cases you're talking about. There are a number of cases that deal with this personal motives thing. I know those cases. I haven't looked at them in detail, but I know the concept. I understand what you are trying to capture with that.

Let me just ask you one thing -- two things that I think will inform my views -- maybe three things on this topic.

The first thing is, if we were to stick with the respondent superior language that's in your draft of Friday, but we were to change the word interest to activities, is that something that you're sort of thinking about or do you want to add this language anyway? The word interest I get a little hung up on.

THE COURT: I understand that. I don't think in this case there is really a substantive distinction between that. I would have to think about it more. I might be able to be

convinced, as I say, one of those three words -- business or activities or interest.

MR. YALOWITZ: I don't have a problem with activities.

THE COURT: I think technically it really is supposed to apply to a situation where they are acting in furtherance of the employer's business, interest or activities. I think that's really technically what it is supposed to be.

You asked me to take out commercial or noncommercial business activities. If you want me to stick back to that, I will think about it. But it seems to me the essence of what I need to get to the jury is that these employees were engaged in this activity because they believed it was in the interest of their employer to do so. I don't see anything sophisticated about that. You may not prefer that word because it may seem like it is a somewhat easier test than the others words, but I don't think it is.

MR. YALOWITZ: My problem with the word is it just pops out. It's not anywhere else.

THE COURT: It's supposed to pop out because that's the critical part. That's the only part you're really fighting about. That's why I am trying to make it pop out. The jury decides that issue and they go back home. They don't need to find whether or not it's an employer or employee, or whether or not the employee was employed at the time. None of those things the jury should spend an iota of consideration on.

MR. YALOWITZ: I am not explaining my problem. If you use the word activities, I don't have a problem, and I will tell you why. Because you have got a very good, detailed instruction on what is the scope of employment. That's the ultimate question for the jury, were they acting within the scope of their employment? And you go through, it has to be within the scope of their authority, it has to be in furtherance of the employer's business, the employer's business is its regularly conducted activities. That's just a standard PJI charge. I don't have a problem with any of that.

Then there is this kind of old language that lingers in some of the cases from a long time ago, and sometimes it carries through, in furtherance of the interest. And I think that's shorthand for this solely personal motives thing.

I am not convinced that the evidence really supports it. You see that in a sexual harassment case, for example, where the defendant comes and says, look, how is it possible that sexual harassment is in furtherance of my business? I make widgets. And they say, that's purely personal motive.

THE COURT: But that's true in this case. That's the same argument. They are not in the business of terrorism.

They are in the business of governing the West Bank. So that's not what they were set up for. They make widgets. They make security and governance for the Palestinian territory. That's what they are in the business of. They are not supposed to be

in the business of terrorism.

MR. YALOWITZ: They are not supposed to be, but they are.

THE COURT: That's not their business activity. So the analogy you just gave me is spot on. It is not the standard, oh, well, I'm the UPS driver and I run somebody over while I was delivering a package. That's respondent superior.

MR. YALOWITZ: Well, if the UPS driver did it on purpose and they gave him a promotion and a raise --

negligence case. OK? This is a deliberate, intentional tortious act. It's not about the UPS driver. You're right, it would be a different analysis if the UPS driver ran over people on purpose. Then I wouldn't be saying, well, if the jury decides that was in furtherance of UPS's business, of course it's not in furtherance of their business. They are not in the business of deliberately running over people with a UPS truck. But if they gave a nod and a wink to the driver and said, the FedEx president is crossing the street tomorrow, we wouldn't be unhappy if something happened to him, and then he ran him over with a UPS truck, then you would say, well, that was clearly in furtherance of their interest because they wanted this to happen.

That's what I am trying to struggle with here in terms of being fair to both sides and laying that out for the jury

and give you an opportunity to argue whatever you want to argue. But you have not convinced me that it is a legally inappropriate instruction to say that they have to act in furtherance of the interest because that's even some of the language that's used in the cases. I don't think I made that language up.

MR. YALOWITZ: You didn't make that language up.

Number one, my problem is I have got Judge Friendly and Judge Calabresi, and Judge Calabresi, who -- Judge Friendly and Judge Calabresi, they are not writing about the law of Guam just because they think it is important to give guidance on the law of Guam. In fact, those two cases are in the restatement as the correct standard of law. And I am sure that when this case goes to the Second Circuit, and it will, those cases are going to be the first things they look at.

THE COURT: Well, not necessarily, because there is another case that should be the first case they look at. There is a more recent case, and I forget which case I looked at — they even cited it in their letter — that lays out exactly what I said. The Second Circuit says exactly what said.

MR. YALOWITZ: I guarantee you I know what case Judge Calabresi is going to be looking at if he is on the panel.

THE COURT: As I say, it takes two of them to reverse one of me.

MR. YALOWITZ: I am sure you read those cases. I am

sure you understand my issue of in furtherance of. I don't have a problem with -- the way you have rewritten it, first, I want to think about it, and I may give you some refinements.

THE COURT: This is my model and you can give me suggestions.

MR. YALOWITZ: Particularly to avoid confusion. But when I look at that last paragraph, especially just the way you have written it, I don't think it's inconsistent with the cases that I have seen, at least looking at it on first blush. So I don't have a problem with it on first reaction.

I do have a concern about that "in furtherance of" language being in the verdict sheet because I think all of this goes to scope of employment.

THE COURT: The problem I have is that that's the only thing that's in dispute. If I know for sure that the jury determined that in your favor, I know that they have resolved the only genuine factual dispute in this case.

MR. YALOWITZ: I am not sure I understand your thinking on this then. If we went with the new version that we just started looking at right now --

THE COURT: We would have to decide whether or not I leave in the word "business," or change that word to "interest," or change that word to "activities," or if there is some version of business, interest or activities. My preference is interest. Then I will use that as a model if you

have some other specific issues with regard to this instruction. But I have literally lifted this out of the PJI instruction almost word for word that you cited to me in support of your modified PJI instruction. So I decided to go back to the newer version of it and add the case law and the language that I know has been approved.

MR. YALOWITZ: We may be down to really short strokes. Of the three words, I think the one that fits the facts of this case and is fairest to both sides is activities. If we changed in furtherance of interest to in furtherance of activities in the verdict sheet, and we change business activities in the instructions, or regularly conducted activities — I think regularly conducted activities is more consistent with the pattern instructions — I think I may not have a problem with it. I want to reflect on it and look at it, but I may not have a problem with that. And I don't know if you have a problem with it. You have to reflect on it too.

THE COURT: In the abstract I don't have a serious problem with it. I am just trying to make sure that I can focus the jury's attention on what they really need to spend their time on. I have given it a lot of thought before I put it in there. I didn't just willy-nilly put it in there. I think that that best addresses the arguments that both sides want to argue about.

MR. YALOWITZ: I think the language that you came up

with this morning or over the weekend better captures the concept that we are talking about. I think this paragraph, subject to it may need some refinement, I think that is a better instruction than what we had before.

THE COURT: One of the reasons why I stayed away from their business, other than what I have just said, is because you specifically asked me to take out the reference to commercial and noncommercial. That was sort of important because what this case is about, you're right, if it's about business at all, it's about noncommercial business. It is not about commercial business. So rather than make them think this has something to do with a real business, that's not what we are trying to tell them in this case. As you say, this is more like the exception that you gave about sexual harassment than it is about a standard negligence respondeat superior theory.

MR. YALOWITZ: Everybody has understood that. My opening was business as usual, standard operating procedure.

THE COURT: I am not wedded to it because I think both sides can clearly articulate what you say the determinative facts are supposed to be, and argue consistent with what you want the jury to determine, and unless you somehow misstate the law, I think you're probably going to make it clearer than I exactly what it is you two are fighting about.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's the problem. Ultimately the instructions are from you.

THE COURT: But ultimately the facts are from you. So that's what is at issue here. I don't think the instructions are particularly complex. If I had to rewrite these instructions, I would probably write them in five or six pages.

Generally, what is at issue here, they have to figure out whether or not this is what the PA wanted to happen.

That's basically all it comes down to. There is no more or less complicated way to analyze it. You tell them what the facts are that they are supposed to evaluate in terms of whether or not this is really what they wanted to happen, and they did something to make it happen, or their employees did it because they made clear to their employees they wanted it to happen.

Mr. Rochon, did you have something?

MR. ROCHON: I share the view that I want to think about it a little bit further as well. I think the word activities I might end up concluding is too vague when applying to government to give the guidance we need. I would like to think about that a little bit further. As to government, it's hard to come up with the perfect word. I recognize that. We know that it's not a commercial business. The jury knows that as well. So if you use the word business, they are not going to think we are talking about the PA is selling things. So I want to think about it a little more.

THE COURT: The only other thing I could use some

guidance on now, the verdict form, as we talked about it and you convinced me on certain issues, I became of the view that this case is really about either they did this directly under the theory of respondent superior of the PA or that they provided material support. That's why I backed away from it. It was getting too complicated, and I backed away from, well, did they themselves commit this offense?

Quite frankly, the facts before the jury for the jury to resolve, they need to resolve whether or not the PA is responsible because the employees were employees at the time and did it in furtherance of their business, interests or activities. To the extent that they don't find that, they just need to determine whether or not they provided material support to anybody else or anybody who was committing this offense.

I guess one can argue that there is someplace that technically they can decide that it wasn't respondeat superior but somehow those people who were bombers or shooters were still acting as individuals or agents of the PA and/or the PLO. But if they provided material support to any one of these, that's a violation of the act, and whether the jury wants to try to figure out whether we are asking them something significantly different, in terms of asking them whether there is a direct participation, I'm not even sure respondeat superior is particularly useful to them as a theory. Because if they find that they provided material support for one or all

of these acts, that's it, game over. They don't have to decide anything else. They could decide on a different theory. They could decide material support to Al Aqsa and Hamas. As I say, I have put some of those things in. We have already taken out funds. And they could find that they harbored somebody. But it seems to me once they decide the material support question, they are going straight to damages.

So I think those are the two critical questions, whether they provided material support by providing personnel, providing their own employees, by assisting others. It doesn't really matter beyond that whether or not they harbored somebody. Obviously, if they provided material support, I don't see how they can't determine they provided material support for one of these terrorist acts and not determine that they provided material support to Hamas or Al Aqsa Brigade once they were designated a terrorist organization to commit those terrorist acts. They still have to determine independently whether or not there is sufficient evidence that those entities were the perpetrators.

I guess I can throw back in my questions initially about whether or not they were responsible for the terrorist acts because their agents committed the offense.

MR. YALOWITZ: That's the only one that I wanted to kick around a little bit. What you said makes a lot of sense to me. The issue with agents, quite frankly, is some -- I

mean, employee is an agent so that's one thing. But some of the people were not agents and some of the entities were not agents. So there is evidence in the record --

THE COURT: I don't know how you can say that, when you say some of the people are not agents.

MR. YALOWITZ: Were agents. Maybe I misspoke.

So, for example, there is evidence from which a jury can conclude that Wafa Idris was an agent of the PA. There is evidence from which a jury can conclude that Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades was an agent of the PLO. So that's kind of a useful way to talk about it to the jury.

THE COURT: It depends on where you want them to concentrate their time. Because you're going to have a much simpler discussion with regard to material support. You don't even have to talk about how deeply involved they were. The only question for the jury is did they provide material support, as I define that for them. And if they provided material support, they are in the soup. That's it. They cannot do that. If they provided material support, they are responsible for these acts, if they did so. And if you find that they provided material support, then that's the end of the discuss. Then all you have to decide is how much you're going to provide in damages, when you find damages, if the incident that you say that they provided material support for caused those damages.

It doesn't matter whether they provided 100 percent of the support or they provided 1 percent of the support. If they provided material support, then they are responsible for these attacks. And if you find that they did not provide material support, that these people were off doing this on their own, and they did nothing to knowingly assist -- I shouldn't use the word assist -- but knowingly further the accomplishment of these terrorist acts, then that's the end of the discussion and you go home.

You just have to figure out how you want to spend your time because these are the arguments that the two of you are going to have to make. Probably more so for the plaintiff than the defendant. If you want to spend your time making an argument and explaining to the jury why they have to decide whether there was respondent superior, whether there was material support, whether they independently committed the offense, and whether they harbored or supported Hamas —

MR. YALOWITZ: We plaintiffs, we like lots of options.

THE COURT: Options are good.

MR. YALOWITZ: At some point you have to give up optionality.

THE COURT: The jurors sat through weeks and weeks of testimony. It's your job to make it simple for them if you want a verdict in your favor. They try to make us think when we get to law school to take something simple and make it

complicated. It's just the opposite, particularly as a trial lawyer. It's your time to make this simple for them and say, look, we are not fighting about 85 percent of the facts here. We know who the players are. We know who the bombers are. We know who is in charge, who is supposed to be in charge. If the PA or the PLO decided that they wanted this to take place, they provided material support so it can take place.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ YALOWITZ}\colon$$  I want to think about it and finalize my views.

THE COURT: I can very quickly put them back in. But as you can see, this verdict form as of now is 21 pages. I think it was like 45 pages when I threw in a direct liability question as to the PA and then another separate liability question as to the PLO with regard to every single incident.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ YALOWITZ}\colon$$  I think we are down to a narrow set of questions here. Let reflect on it.

The only thing on the verdict form that I see right now that I really know I want a change on is that word interests. Like I said, I don't have a problem with activities, especially given that last paragraph in the new instructions.

THE COURT: I think you suggested that I change the order back.

MR. YALOWITZ: I want to think about that more.

THE COURT: It depends on whether we throw back in an

independent question of liability as to each defendant. The reason I did this is because, if they decide the material support question, then the others get to be a lot easier. Not necessarily determinative on every single thing. They can still find that they provided material support, but they didn't harbor.

MR. YALOWITZ: Why don't we leave it in the order that you have got it, unless I come back and say, no, no, I really want you to change it.

THE COURT: Also, I think it's more consistent with the separate determinations that have to be made by the jury with regard to the PA and the PLO. I have technically put it in the order in which it is in the caption. As a matter of fact, on the last one I had reversed the caption. But I put it in the order that's in the caption so they should decide whether the PLO provided material support, and then they should decide whether the PA provided material support, and then they should decide whether an employee of the PA in fact carried out the act, and then there is the PA and the PLO questions with regard to harboring, and there is the PA and the PLO questioning with regard to providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization.

Quite frankly, the easiest determination -- not the easiest, but the consistent determination will be pretty much, if they find material support with regard to the PA or the PLO,

they are clearly likely to find that they provided material support to the foreign terrorist organization.

MR. YALOWITZ: The only other thing I wanted to cover --

MR. ROCHON: If we are going to leave this one, I can wait until the end if that is easier for Mr. Yalowitz.

MR. YALOWITZ: It would be easier if you waited.

The other thing I wanted to cover, the other thing I put in my letter is that sort of intro to the antiterrorism act where we talk about -- I don't remember the exact wording, but the violent attacks.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: I don't have a strong position on that. I might go your way on that one. I want to think about it a little bit. It's just a question of clarity, as far as I'm concerned. I just want to be consistent. You want me to say act of international terrorism?

MR. YALOWITZ: Yeah.

THE COURT: I don't have a problem with that. I don't know why the defendants would have a problem with that.

MR. YALOWITZ: I just don't want there to be something that is misused in closing, that's my concern.

THE COURT: As I said, I don't have a strong opinion about that, and I'm probably willing to give you that. And there was something else that you suggested changing. I made the change that you asked me to separate the knowing from the first element. You asked me to separate that, and I did.

And I'm probably going to move up -- I did make a change over the weekend, I will move up the respondent superior and the agency language even further. I'm not totally comfortable where it is, but I know it should be closer to the elements, and I think I have it after the injury sort of transition section into damages. And I don't think it should be in between those two, I'm talking about moving page 51, the instruction on 51 and through 57 to before 49, where 49 starts talking about injury, more related to liability than injury, and I would move it up at least in front of that, if not

further than that.

MR. YALOWITZ: I think Sand puts it even earlier, but it's so discretionary.

THE COURT: The problem is I don't want to separate —
I'm trying to struggle with separating the different — the
harboring and the material support and providing material
support to a terrorist organization. I wanted to keep all of
those in a group. So I couldn't find a convenient place to
stick this in between that, maybe I could stick it in between
before I get to the harboring and the other sections, if I will
just deal right after I get the basic elements or put it right
back where it originally was right up front. But up front, I
didn't think it was as useful until I knew what the elements
were.

MR. YALOWITZ: I think it's a classical problem, and I think that's why they solved it by putting it up front, because they don't want it to break up the elements. But I think they'll get the picture wherever you put it.

THE COURT: I will take the suggestion and talk about it more tomorrow.

Mr. Rochon?

MR. ROCHON: I anticipate from your conversation that you're likely to send around a new draft here fairly soon. Am I right or wrong?

THE COURT: Yeah, I might not be able to get it to you

before the morning, but I still have this other afternoon commitment. And I don't know if I'm going to be where I want to be, but by tomorrow morning, before you rest you will definitely have it, and hopefully by the time we start in the morning.

MR. ROCHON: The part where -- the colloquy about the verdict form is helpful.

And on the agency issue, when I look at the evidence, it's hard to envision any scenario in which the jury would be saying no on material support and yet reach --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROCHON: So it has the capacity to confuse. I don't know the Court's tentative views.

THE COURT: My tentative view is I took it out. I took it out because I thought as long as they decided material support, that's a more direct analysis for them, and that's — who cares whether they had — whether they independently did it on their own. It doesn't matter. If they provided material support then they're responsible.

And so my view was to take out and to simplify it.

I'm not sure that I am of the view that the plaintiff is
entitled to it if they really wanted to do that, but I didn't
see the advantage to either the plaintiff or the defendant to
do that particularly.

I also have in mind -- I know a little bit about

jurors and how they use the verdict forms and how it guides them in terms of what they focus on. And that was one of the reasons why I put the order this way, because I wanted to focus their attention and look and figure out if they provided material support. Because if they did, then that will guide a quicker discussion with regard to that. If they started out with the employer liability, I think that's a too limited an analysis for them to spend the first hours or days discussing with regard to whether or not they're confident that support was provided.

We can debate about the semantics of whether aiding and abetting. Obviously providing material support is a different analysis than simply being the person who sent out their minions to blow themselves up or shoot people, and I put it that way to focus the jury.

I need, Mr. Yalowitz -- I guess both sides, make sure I have all the plaintiffs correct and all the plaintiffs are still in the case. That was my best analysis, judgment. Both sides should look at that if I have left anybody out or didn't put anybody in.

MR. YALOWITZ: We'll double-check. I didn't -nothing jumped out at me that somebody was missing or that
someone should have been dismissed out on the summary judgment
wasn't. I don't mean legally, I mean logistically, I'm not
conceding that summary judgment.

THE COURT: I understand.

Mr. Rochon, you should let me know if you want really -- if you have what would be basically an obvious argument to make that I should eliminate some theory out of this case that goes to the jury. Otherwise, my inclination at this point is to let the jury handle this first and then determine whether or not -- unless I think there's some significant prejudice to you given the case, I want to see what they have to say about these claims first, unless there's some clear legally insufficient claim that I should take away from that. Then I can reevaluate, if they don't rule in your favor on that issue, whether it's supported by the evidence.

Because part of the problem in a trial like this, you should have an opportunity and I should have an opportunity to go back to the transcript and make sure that we, as you say, what we think is there is really there and/or and make a determination. So I am willing to hear you tomorrow. What I would anticipate is that we send the jury home early tomorrow and have final discussions and sum up on Thursday.

MR. YALOWITZ: The only problem I have with that -and look, this is really up to you, the problem I have with
that is this we have several plaintiffs in anticipation of
Wednesday summations are on their way back to New York and
would like to hear the summations on Wednesday. If we can get
to them, I understand we've got -- we may not be able to.

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If we go until Thursday it's a problem getting these particular individuals back to Israel on Thursday night because by the time they fly and land it's too late for them to get home to observe the Sabbath. So that means we have to keep them in New York several days. Look, at the end of -- we may not be able to get to summations on Wednesday. If we can't, we're in your hands on that, but it would be very helpful to these -- it's four of them, it's not everybody, it's four of them. THE COURT: Well, that begs the question. Let me ask at this point, at this time, Mr. Rochon, approximately how long do you anticipate your summation? MR. ROCHON: I would say 90 minutes. THE COURT: Mr. Yalowitz? MR. YALOWITZ: Seven hours. But I'm going to cut it down between now and then. THE COURT: Can you give me a more specific estimate? MR. YALOWITZ: Look, I think I'm likely to go two hours. I think that's likely. I'm over that right now, and I know I need to cut it down, but that's kind of where I'm thinking. THE COURT: Mr. Rochon, did you want -- if possible,

THE COURT: Mr. Rochon, did you want -- if possible, did you want to start tomorrow afternoon?

MR. ROCHON: Here's what I was thinking, I think we have some things to address, including some things on the Rule

50 we would like to talk to you about tomorrow, and getting the instructions and knowing them is helpful to have that the day before.

THE COURT: Well, you pretty much got in essence.

MR. ROCHON: This agency stuff, and I heard you on the verdict form, but on the instructions I understand the Court — I don't understand the Court is also taking out the instructions or would instruct agency but not have it on the verdict form.

THE COURT: I think it's appropriate to instruct on agency with regard to material support.

MR. ROCHON: We want to discuss that with you, of course.

THE COURT: We can discuss that further, but the problem I have with that argument is that specifically the instruction I give the jury is that this kind of entity can only act through its agents. It can only act through other entities or human beings, but more likely human beings.

And so the PA is not a person. It doesn't have legs and arms, it can't physically do anything. People have to do it as its agents. That's the only context in which I think agency is particularly relevant in this case is that an entity can only act through its agents.

So I think they need to know -- and for the benefit of both sides, they need to know if you need to find a person who

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is of high responsibility so that they, just like any corporate circumstance, they are considered a managerial person or can be an employee that you're directing.

But the real responsibility for most of this in terms of providing material support would be to the extent that a high-level individual is not themselves giving directions, or as they say Arafat is not directly giving money or support or whatever other resources to do a terrorist act, that to the extent that he gave that responsibility to others, they are the agents of the PA and the PLO. And if they demonstrate that they were acting with that given authority, just similar but a little different, a lot different than respondeat superior, if they are given that authority and they act at the behest, direction, command or encouragement of a responsible PA or PLO official, they go out and to those acts as their agents, and the PLO or PA can't say well, Arafat didn't strap a bomb to himself, or Arafat didn't drive unlawful interests to cross the border, or an employee of the PA didn't do that, as long as they establish that somebody, that you got to do that on your behalf because that's what you wanted to happen, then they are your agent for the acts that they do to accomplish that.

MR. ROCHON: So I think on that one it will be helpful to continue to discuss, because obviously employees are sort of easy to figure out. And the question is -- and what I think the defense ought to be entitled to here, if we don't prevail

on not giving the instruction, is to give a clear understanding of who the plaintiffs contend are agents on these facts.

Because we're going to have argument -- I'm going first, and I do need to know their theories before I argue.

So I would like to discuss the -- because our view on these facts, it's really hard to see the agency argument as separated from the direct support to one of AMB or whatever or the respondeat superior argument, and we want clarity on what this instruction would allow the plaintiffs to argue, particularly since I won't be arguing after Mr. Yalowitz but before. But in any event, I want to know this.

THE COURT: I think your first guidance, unless
Mr. Yalowitz wants to give you greater guidance, is anybody
that the evidence indicates that was either instructed or
directed or requested to commit this terrorist act or to do
something which would be necessary to facilitate this terrorist
act.

This person — to the extent the jury should find this person was given that direction by a high level responsible PA person, or they could infer that that was who they got those directions from, that person, in acting to facilitate that terrorist act, could constitute an agent of the PLO. I can't tell you as to each one of these six ones who the one to ten people that they claim fit that category, but —

MR. ROCHON: It's such a vague sort of instruction how

in this case one would sort of parse out how one would argue where you don't have the traditional agency relationships.

THE COURT: I don't think this is an unusual -- I think it is a traditional agency relationship. I think agents -- I don't think -- you seem to want to make something more sophisticated than it is. If I asked to you go to McDonald's and get me a Big Mac, you're my agent. There's nothing sophisticated about that. This has nothing to do with the PA structure.

MR. ROCHON: I'm responsible for your cholesterol.

THE COURT: But I didn't see -- in reading through your suggestion, I didn't see any real argument that the law that I stated on agency is incorrect.

MR. ROCHON: The question is whether the facts justify giving the instruction is much more than whether, as stated, it would be right. The question would be on these facts whether all of that law would be appropriate.

THE COURT: But you didn't identify for me which ones would not be appropriate.

MR. ROCHON: I'm still a little vague. It may seem obvious for everyone else. I know the plaintiffs referenced Wafa Idris would be deemed an agent of the PA or PLO. I'm not sure the facts would support being an agent of the PLO or even the PA because their evidence is that she got the bomb at the Mukataa. So the question is can that instruction — that if

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the facts support.

that theory isn't applicable in that incident, I want to know, because I got to know what I'm fighting. I can't shadow box in the dark. THE COURT: Let's put it this way. Mr. Yalowitz is a nice guy, but frankly, I don't have a lot of confidence that he will be nice enough to tell you exactly what he will argue. But you know what the record shows. The record shows that there's a possible argument or there isn't a possible argument. It shows who the people are who the jury can determine were involved and who weren't the people involved. It shows that they had some connection with the PA or the PLO or they didn't have connection with the PA or the PLO. If he wants to be more specific for you, fine, then he should do so, but --MR. ROCHON: Maybe we should assume for just this conversation that he decides not to be more specific. That was my basic premise. THE COURT: MR. ROCHON: That was the choice he made. THE COURT: What do you want me to force him to do, tell you exactly everybody he's going to say is an agent? MR. ROCHON: Well, I think --THE COURT: I'm not sure you're entitled to this. MR. ROCHON: I think we are entitled to know who they arque who is going to be an agent of our clients. THE COURT: They're going to argue whatever they think

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MR. ROCHON: Yeah, but I mean presumably they won't 1 2 argue people that facts don't support would be their position. 3 THE COURT: If they do, I'm sure you will --4 MR. ROCHON: This all started as to when we ought to 5 That's how we get on this track. And I think it would 6 be beneficial to have some argument on the Rule 50 tomorrow to 7 get clarity on this. I do think it would be beneficial to work through the witnesses, work through the instructions, work 8 9 throughout verdict form, have those arguments and close the 10 next day, even if somebody does need to stay here or beyond 11 There's a 10 o'clock flight to Tel Aviv out of New 12 York. I've been on it more times than I would like to admit 13 over the course of the last seven years, 50 or 60 times. 14 MR. YALOWITZ: They can't take a flight like that. 15 The problem is --THE COURT: You're not being heard by me or the court 16 17 The reality is -- I don't want to spend the time 18 because I don't need to debate that. The reality is I 19 structured it as best I can. I am not going to force 20 Mr. Rochon -- if you want to sum up first, maybe I will 21 consider it. 22 MR. YALOWITZ: Open and close and then a final --23 THE COURT: Short rebuttal. If you want to consider 24 that, I will consider doing that. But I'm not going to put the

burden on Mr. Rochon so he has to scramble to accommodate your

plaintiffs that he has to close tomorrow. Now if he wants to do that, he can. If you want to do that, you can.

But otherwise, I can't control the weather, I expect -- look, I was in a situation where I was calling jurors between 8:30 and 9 o'clock who were on their way, somebody already arrived here, to tell them they should stay home. I will do the best I can. If you want to talk to Mr. Rochon to see if you can work that out, or if you want to open first and Mr. Rochon can open after you and I will give you short rebuttal, you can consider that. But I don't think I'm in a position to force him to open for your convenience.

MR. YALOWITZ: I understand that. Look, I had one other thing I want to raise with the Court, but I was hoping we might take a short break.

THE COURT: Well, I want to wind up.

MR. YALOWITZ: So let me quickly say the final thing on my mind, which is reflecting on that final paragraph on respondeat superior, there are New York cases that say -- I don't think there's any dispute this is the law -- where an employee is traveling on company business and personal business, that doesn't alleviate the company of liability. We may want to just add something like that for clarity. I don't have language in mind.

THE COURT: Think about it. If you have some language that you suggest -- I thought about this in a lot of different

ways, I can't think of anything particularly applicable here that the jury needs legal instructions on, but you want to fashion something, propose something to me, be prepared with it tonight or tomorrow morning, and we'll discuss it. I want to make sure that we could be ready to begin summations as early as Thursday.

MR. YALOWITZ: Or possibly tomorrow. I might come in in the morning and say look, let's get to it, let's get the jury going. And the defendants may not agree, they may want to go first because they want primacy.

THE COURT: You can work that out tonight or this afternoon. Talk about it and see if that is really that important to your clients.

MR. YALOWITZ: We'll try to figure that out, but I'm sure whatever we want they will agree with anyway.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me go back and do some work before I leave this afternoon and do some more tonight, and then we'll be ready to wind up the witnesses tomorrow and address all the issues again and be ready to go tomorrow afternoon or Wednesday -- I mean Thursday morning.

If you are correct about your summations, I anticipate an hour or two from the defense and two to three hours from the plaintiff. Did I get that wrong? Then we might be in a position to hopefully — at that rate we'll be in a position to charge the jury and send them in to start their deliberations

F2HTSOK4 on the same day. Go to work, and I will see you tomorrow morning. Let's start at 9:15 so we can make sure we're all set to go. MR. YALOWITZ: For planning purposes, if the defendants have decided that they're definitely calling or not calling any of the witnesses, then that would be useful information. THE COURT: Hopefully they can provide that information as quickly as they're able to determine. MR. ROCHON: Thank you, your Honor. (Adjourned to February 18, 2015 at 9:15 a.m.)